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ABSTRACT 
Millions of American teens are employed today in a variety of 
workplaces., The jobs they hold typically provide little human capital 
for their future economic self·sufficiency, and pose substantial 
immediate and long-term safety, academic, and behavioral risks for 
this generation-. This Article seeks to answer the question of how 
American law and society reached this situation, which has such 
disastrous effects for working youth, their families, and society as a 
whole. Three main themes are developed: 
1. Child labor has always been part of the American economy, 
from colonial times until today. While there have been more than 150 
years of effort to curtail youth employment, this movement has been 
generally unsuccessful at both federal and state levels. 
2. The federal .courts, and particularly the United States Supreme 
Court, defeated repeated statutory attempts to restrict child labor. This 
judicial activism is demonstrated by the previously untold factual and 
*Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. Parts of this Article were 
originally presented at the Annual Colloquium on Current Developments in Labor and 
Employment Law and at several Work-in-Progress sessions. I thank the many 
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Ivan Bodensteiner and RosaJie Levinson for insightful comments. Invaluable research 
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School of Law, 2010. As always, my colleague Melissa Mundt contributed 
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89 
90 WHITTIER JOURNAL OF CHILD AND FAMILY ADVOCACY [Vol. 10: I 
legal history of several cases, especially the famous decision in 
Hammer v. Dagenhart. 
3. With Locknerismfinally demolished by the Great Depression of 
the 1930s, the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was to 
be the death knell for child labor. This victory was, in fact, pyrrhic. 
The weaknesses of the FLSA resulted in the continuation of youth 
employment. These statutory deficiencies were the outcome of a toxic 
combination of factors: profits from cheap labor, entrenched and 
powerful economic interests, and racism. 
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I.INTRODUCTION 
Charles Dickens' fictional portrayal of nineteenth century English 
child labor was based largely on his own youthful factory experience 
while his father sat in debtor's prison. 1 The vivid descriptions of 
1. When his father was sent to Pauper's Prison Charles Dickens was forced to 
work in a shoe blacking factory, where his peers calJed him "scholar." Dickens later 
described himself in David Copperfield: "a child of exceJient abilities and with strong 
power of observation, quick, eager, delicate and soon hurt bodily, or mentally." 
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abandonment and exploitation in Oliver Twist, David Copperfield, and 
other novels were powerful protests against a system that robbed youth 
of childhood and long-term life prospects for employer profit. While 
Parliament ultimately passed statutes ostensibly safeguarding child 
workers, these laws provided only limited protection and were rarely 
enforced.2 On this side of the Atlantic, children3 have been an integral 
part of the labor market from the founding of the American colonies to 
our contemporary globalized economy. 
In the United States, after an extraordinary campaign spanning 
more than half a century, Congress enacted national legislation on child 
labor.4 Since the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 
1938, public policy on child labor has changed little. The federal 
statute and similar state laws barred children under eighteen from 
mining and manufacturing worksites producing goods in interstate 
commerce.
5 The FLSA also proscribed "oppressive child labor."6 
Charles Dickens, David Copperfield Vol. I in The Works of Charles Dickens 184 
(Charles Scribner's Sons 1899). His personal experience was mirrored in almost all his 
works together with the images of the conditions he saw while forced to work to 
support his family. Robert Langton, The Childhood and Youth of Charles Dickens 72-
80 (The Author at Albert Chambers 1891 ). 
2. The most important Factory Acts regulating the hours of labor for both adults 
and children were passed in 1833, 1844, and 1847. See generally John Ward, The 
Factory Movement: 1830-1855 (1962). Ward traces early efforts in England for reform 
of labor within factories. Labor advocates at this time noted sixteen-hour workdays of 
children working in ninety-degree factories, youth who uwere industry cripples treated 
worse than dogs." /d. at 56. Three decades of advocacy ended with a sixty-hour 
workweek, which was rarely enforced. /d. at 346. 
3. The U.S. common law recognizes legal adulthood as beginning at age 
eighteen or upon emancipation, marriage, or with parental consent. Douglas Abrams & 
Sarah Ramsey, Children & The Law 811 (3d ed., West 2007). 
4. The term "child labor" is used here to describe paid employment by persons 
under eighteen years of age. "Youth workers" and other terms are used throughout this 
Article synonymously. 
5. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 C.F.R. § 570.2(a)(i) (20 10); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 570.2(a)(ii) (20 1 0); 29 U .S.C. § 203(1) (20 1 0). 
6. Children under age eighteen are barred from working in jobs administratively 
defined to be "particularly hazardous ... or detrimental to their health or well-being." 
29 U .S.C. § 212( c) (20 I 0). Even this limited protection is conditioned by specific 
exemptions for occupations other than manufacturing and mining, for example, 
agriculture. If the occupation has been declared hazardous by the Secretary of Labor, 
eighteen is the minimum age to work in that job. See 29 C.F.R. § 570.120 (20 I 0). 
Those designations have remained unchanged since 1975. 29 C.F.R. § 570.67 (20 I 0). 
See infra notes 328-340 and accompanying text. 
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Aside from those limits, adolescents over sixteen have no restriction on 
time or place of their work.7 Fourteen- to sixteen-year olds have some 
limited time restrictions, 8 but are free to work in most worksites. 
Today, the FLSA and equivalent state 1egislation9 are assumed to 
protect American youth workers from exploitation in the workplace. 
When Americans are at all cognizant of issues of child labor, the image 
is that of exploited children in Third World countries. Yet this 
soothing picture masks a very different reality. Despite the best efforts 
of American reformers for over 100 years, restrictions on child labor 
have remained more symbolic than real. Although some of the worst 
abuses of the nineteenth century have been abolished, at least five 
million American adolescents are at work after schoo1;10 hundreds of 
thousands toil in agriculture. 11 The United States has the highest 
percentage of working children of any developed nation. 
7. Schmidt v. Reich, 835 F. Supp. 435, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
8. Fourteen- to sixteen-year-olds may not work more than eighteen hours per 
week during the school year, nor after 7:00 p.m. on a school night. 29 C.P.R. 
§ 570.35(a) (20 1 0). 
9. The FLSA explicitly does not pre-empt state child labor laws. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 218 (2010). 
10. Millions of youths under eighteen are in the contemporary American 
workforce but the precise number remains elusive. The Child Labor Coalition (CLC) 
estimates 5.5 million youth age twelve to seventeen are in the workforce. Child Labor 
Coalition, Youth Employment Statistics, http://www.stopchildlabor.org/USchildlabor/ 
statistics.htm (accessed Jan. 25, 2011 ). Approximately 70--80% of youth work in paid 
jobs at some point while attending high school. Alexis M. He11nan, U.S. Dept. of Lab., 
Report on the Youth Labor Force 75, http://stats.bls.gov/opub/rylf/pdf/rylf2000.pdf 
(revised Nov. 2000). 
11. Estimates concerning the number and makeup of child fannworkers vary 
widely. See Celeste Corlett, Impact of the 2000 Child Labor Treaty on U.S. Child 
Laborers, 19 Ariz. J. Inti. & Comp. L. 713, 713 (2002) (estimating 800,000 to 1.5 
million children age five to fifteen toil in harsh conditions in the U.S. agriculture 
industry). In 1998, the General Accounting Office (now the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO)) estimated that 300,000 youth aged fifteen to seventeen 
were working in agriculture. The U.S. Department of Agricu)ture's National 
Agricultural Statistics Services (NASS) stated that 431,730 youth between the ages of 
twelve and seventeen were hired for agricultural work in 1998. Association of Farm 
Workers Opportunity Programs, Children in the Fields: An American Problem 6, 
http://afop.org/download/ II/ (2007). See Child Labor Coalition, Children in the Fields 
Campaign Fact Sheet, http :1/www. stopchi ldl abor. org/Consumercampaigns/fi e1 ds. htm 
(2007) (estimating over 400,000 children between ages twelve to seventeen work in 
agriculture). Hospital emergency room and workers compensation data suggests that 
youth injuries in agriculture are more severe than those at other worksites. Child Labor 
Coalition, supra n. I 0. 
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Approximately 80-90% of youth work in paid jobs at some point while 
attending high schooJ.12 Once having begun paid employment they 
usually continue to work with increasing frequency and intensity. 
Restrictions on the number of hours and the type of work they do are 
minimal13 and penalties for violation of child labor laws are 
extraordinarily lax.14 
This employment presents potential benefits for the adolescent, 
including income, valuable lessons about responsibility and finances, 
and transferrable job skills. However, children's work in the United 
States most especially "high intensity" work, i.e., more than twenty 
hours per week 15 poses substantial immediate and long-term 
academic, safety and health risks for youth workers. These adolescents 
have less academic success in high school 16 and increased 
absence/drop-out rates than those who do not work or work fewer 
hours. 17 They are also more likely to use cigarettes and other harmful 
12. Herman, supra n. 10, at 75. Over half the youths interviewed by the DOL 
responded that they had held jobs at the age of fourteen; over 60o/o worked at age 
fifteen. /d. at 14-15. See also Ellen Greenberger & Laurence D. Steinberg, When 
Teenagers Work: The Psychological and Social Costs of Teenage Employment I 1 
(Basic Books J 986). 
13. While the child labor provisions of the FLSA provide some limits, a tangle of 
exemptions guarantees both complexity and non-coverage of many youth workers. 
Although the Act prohibits adolescents from working in hazardous occupations, 
adolescents over sixteen years of age have no federal restrictions on the number of 
hours or the time of day they may work. See Schmidt, 835 F. Supp. at 444. 
Additionally, the FLSA does not apply to youth employed in activities in an 
"enterprise" with less than $500,000 per year in operations, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 203(s)(l )(A)(ii) (2009), or not affecting interstate commerce, although those workers 
may be protected by state statute. 
14. Civil penalties of $1,000 per violation were first added in 1974 because the 
injunctive and criminal sanctions were detennined to be "insufficiently flexible." Fair 
Labor Standards Act § l6(e), Pub. L. No. 93-259 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
216(e). See also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.~ 446 U.S. 238,244 (1980). 
15. Natl. Research Council Inst. Med., Protecting Youth at Work 3-4 (Natl. Acad. 
Press 1998). 
16. For example, students working longer hours have lower grade point averages. 
See e.g., R. D' Amico, Does Employment During High School Impair Academic 
Progress? 57 Soc. Educ. 152, 152-64 ( 1984 ); Herbert W. Marsh & Sabrina Kleitman, 
Consequences of E1nployment During High School: Character Building, Subversion of 
Academic Goals, or a Threshold? 42 Am. Educ. Res. J. 331, 33 l-369 (2005). 
17. See generally Rhoda V. Carr, James D. Wright & Charles J. Brody, Effects of 
High School Work Experience a Decade Later: Evidence From the National 
Longitudinal Study, 69 Soc. Educ. 66, 66-81 ( 1996); see generally Sharon Wofford 
Mihalic & Delbert S. Elliott, Short- and Long-Term Consequences of Adolescent Work, 
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substances, have more traffic accidents and teen prefnancies, and to 
experience a wide variety of other negative outcomes. 1 
The physical hazards of youth work have always been enormous; 
they_ re~ain so today. T~e numbers of children killed and injured on 
the JOb tn the early twentieth century was well-documented. 1 Today 
the workplace is the fourth most common cause of harm to A.merican 
youths aged ten to nineteen.2° Fatalities of working youth are far too 
common.21 Work-related injury rates for contemporary juvenile 
28 Youth & Socy. 464, 464-489 ( 1997); Jeylan T. Mortimer & Monica Kirkpatrick 
Johnson, New Perspectives on Adolescent Work and the Transition to Adulthood, in 
New Perspectives _on Adolescent Risk Behavior 425 (Richard Jessor ed., Cambridge U. 
Press 1998); Mark Schoenha1s, Marta Tienda & Barbara Schneider, The Educational 
and Personal Consequences of Adolescent Employment, 77 Soc. Forces 723, 723-762 
( 1998). More limited employment during adolescence (twenty hours or less per week 
during school) has been associated with reduced high school drop-out rates. R. 
D'Amico, supra n. 16, at 152-164; see Jennifer C. Lee & Jeremy Staff, When Work 
Matters: The Varying Impact of Adolescent Work Intensity on High School Drop-Out, 
80 Soc. Educ. 158, 158-178 (2007); see generally John Robert Warren & Jennifer C. 
Lee, The Impact of Adolescent Employment on High School Dropout: Differences by 
Individual and Labor-Market Characteristics, 32 Soc. Sci. Res. 98, 98-128 (2003). 
1 8. Richard Jessor & Shirley L. Jessor~ Problem Behavior and Psychological 
Development: A Longitudinal Study of Youth (N.Y .. Acad. Press 1977) (describing 
alcohol use, smoking, drug use and sexual activity as symbolic claims to adult status). 
Negative outcomes associated with high-intensity work may result from "precocious 
development," the assertion of independent adult-like status by teens assuming "adult" 
roles because of school completion, employment, and individual decision-making. 
Jerald Bachman & John E. Schulenberg, How Part-Time Work Intensity Relates to 
Drug Use, Problem Behavior, Time Use and Satisfaction Among High School Seniors: 
Are These Consequences or Merely Correlates?, 29 Dev. Psycho!. 220 (describing 
"precocious adult-like identity" formation). These foster more deviant behavior, 
especially for those working with delinquent peers. Adolescents who are employed 
alongside delinquent coworkers tend to commit more workplace crime, as well as 
demonstrate more general deviance than do those who do not work with deJinquent 
peers. See Matthew Ploeger, Youth Employment and Delinquency.• Reconsidering a 
Problematic Relationship, J5 Criminology 659 ( 1 997); John Paul Wright & Francis T .. 
Cullen, Juvenile Involvement in Occupational Delinquency, 38 Criminology 863 
(2000). 
19. See infra nn. 59-65 and accompanying text. 
20. Only motor vehicle accidents, violence, and recreation do more damage to 
American teens. See generally Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Work-
Related Injuries and Illnesses Associated with Child Labor United States, 1993, 45 
Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 464, 464-468 (1996); D. Laraque, B. Barlow & M. 
Durkin, Prevention of Youth Injuries, 91 J. Natl. Med. Assn. 557, 557-571 ( 1999). 
21. Pau1 A. Schu1te et al.; Integrating Occupational Safety and Health 
Information Into Vocational and Technical Education and Other Workforce 
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workers are consistently between 60%-70% higher than the rates for 
workers of all ages and second only to rates for workers eighteen to 
twenty-four years of age.22 Estimates range up to 200,000-plus 
adolescent workers suffering job-related injuries and illnesses each 
year, a staggering number.23 Moreover, there is good reason to believe 
our count is lower than the actual numbers. 
Our child labor laws restrict private remedies for youth workers, 
while placing primary responsibility for enforcement on administrative 
agencies that consistently fail to enforce even the limited prohibitions 
under current law.24 As an illustrative example, enforcement activity 
of the Wage and Hour Division (WHD), the lead enforcement agency 
Preparation Programs, 95 Am. J. Pub. Health 404, 404 (2005). 
22. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Nonfatal Occupational Injuries 
and Illnesses Among Workers Treated in Hospital Emergency Departments United 
States, 2003, 55 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rpt. 449, 449-452 (2006) [hereinafter 
2003 Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses]; Ctrs. for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses Among Workers Treated in 
Hospital Emergency Departments United States, 2004, 56 Morbidity & Mortality 
Wkly. Rpt. 393, 393-397 (2007) [hereinafter 2004 Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and 
Illnesses]; Natl. Inst. for Occupational Safety and Health, NIOSH Alert: Preventing 
Deaths, Injuries and Illness of Young Workers, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. 
Ctrs. for Disease Control 2, http://www .cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2003-
128/pdfs/2003128.pdf (2003) [hereinafter NIOSH Alert]. 
23. Natl. lnst. for Occupational Safety and Health, Safety and Health Topic: 
Young Worker Safety and Health 1, 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/NIOSHRecsDOLHaz/pdfs/DOL-recomm.pdf (2002) 
[hereinafter NIOSH 2002 Recommendations]. Work-related illness data is even more 
difficult to document than injuries because of the long latency period often associated 
with these pathologies. 
24. In stark contrast to minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the 
FLSA and most civil rights statutes, federal law gives no private right of action for 
children injured or killed while working. See e.g., Breitwieser v. KMS lndust., Inc., 
467 F.2d 1391, 1392 (5th Cir. 1972); Henderson v. Bear, 948 F.2d 144, t 44-146 (Colo. 
App. 1988). The most effected persons aggrieved minor employees and their 
parents are thus unable to sue as "private attorneys general." Between 1988 and 2008 
no employer faced a criminal prosecution for violation of the Act. See generally 29 
U .S.C. § 216(a) (20 1 0). Despite the dangers in farm work, in 2006 just twenty-eight of 
I ,344 federal child labor investigations 2% targeted agribusiness. Child wbor 
Enforcement: Are We Adequately Protecting Our Children? Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, I lOth Cong. (statement of Sally Greenberg, Executive 
Director, National Consumers League) 5, http://www.nclnet.org/worker-rights/82-
child-labor/308-ncl-testimony-to-house-on-child-labor-enforcement (2008). In 2005, 
the number was even lower just twenty·five. /d. In addition, a "one free bite" rule is 
in effect; employers may be jailed only after a prior criminal conviction for violation 
child labor laws. 
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at the federal level, has consistently and dramatically declined over the 
past decade.25 WHD's considerable rulemaking powers have likewise 
atrophied.26 Enforcement of state laws is similarly almost non-
existent. 27 
Nor is this a merely a contemporary phenomenon. Historically, 
restrictions on ,child labor have always been more symbolic than real. 
Where youth were cost-effective substitutes for mechanization or adult 
labor, the FLSA and state statutes had little impact. Child labor 
statutes have always been riddled with exceptions that frequently 
overwhelm statutory norms,28 with enforcement almost non-existent, 
25. See Child Labor Coa1ition, Protecting Working Children in the United States: 
The Government's Striking Decline in Child Labor Enforcement Activities 1, 
http://www .stopchi ldlabor .org/pressroom/CLC%20report% 20Sept% 202006. pdf 
(2006). 
26. Despite thirty-eight urgent proposed changes to the existing DOL Hazardous 
Orders by the National Institute on Occupational Health and Safety (NJOSH) proposed 
in 2002, see NIOSH 2002 Recontmendations, supra n. 23; DOL has, to date, adopted 
only four. DOL has also ignored all proposals to change the agricultural Hazardous 
Occupation Orders. See id.; Child Labor Regulations, Orders and Statements of 
Interpretation; Child Labor Violations-Civil Money Penalties, 69 Fed. Reg. 75382 
(Dec. 16, 2004). 
27. Most states lack the resources needed to effectively enforce child labor laws. 
The number of enforcement officers is dwindling and there are few child labor 
invesf f · 1 ~a Ions. 
2000* 2003** 
Total number of state labor 40 28 
inspectors devoted 
exclusively to child labor 
*In 2000, 39 states reported their statistics to the CLC~ 
**In 2003, 39 states reported their statistics to the CLC. 
***In 2004, 32 states reported their statistics to the CLC. 
2004*** 
.. 19 
Infonnation gathered from the Child Labor Coalition, Child Labor State 
Surveys, http://www .stopchi ldlabor.org/USchildlabor/ (accessed Jan. 29, 
2011) [hereinafter 2004 CLC State Survey]. In 2004, only five states 
conducted inspections targeting child labor compliance in agriculture; a mere 
three states found any child labor violations with a total of nine minors in 
two states, while the third could not-provide figures. /d. (including a table that 
indicates each responding state's statistics). 
28. The Keating-Owen Act of 1916, for example, affected less than 10% 
of all working children. See infra nn. 103-109 and accompanying text. 
Subsequent legislation followed the same pattern. Restrictions on the 
employment of youths in the NRA codes followed the principles of the 
Keating-Owen Act and applied to only one out of every six employed 
youngsters between the ages of ten and sixteen reported by the I 930 Census to 
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either in court or administratively.29 
As a result, American law de facto permits and even prods 
adolescents to work, either full- or part-time. Unfortunately, today's 
workplace encourages 
[y ]oung people [to] perform tasks and use skills ... that few 
perform or use again in work settings after they cease to be 
adolescents . . . [These jobs provide] little meaningful 
contact with adults who have a stake in their socialization 
for the future ... [E]conomic rewards ... typical I y are used 
for . . . records, movies, designer clothing, fast food, 
alcohol, drugs and not for long-term "adult" investments, 
such as college, or for increasing the adolescent's ability to 
establish an independent household.30 
In addition, the law provides adolescents extraordinary freedom to 
make independent decisions on work and school. As a matter of 
federal law, no parental consent or even notice is required before a 
child may work. In many states, children may withdraw from school 
without parental notice or consent once a minimum age is attached. 31 
be working. Jeremy P. Felt, The Child Labor Provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 11 Lab. Hi st. 467, 473 ( 1970). When federal child labor 
regulation was finally upheld in the FLSA, contemporary estimates indicated 
only about 30,000-50,000 employed children would be effected in non-
agricultural occupations, but about 850,000 children fifteen years of age and 
younger were gainfully employed. /d. at 477. Exclusions from the FLSA, 
e.g., work in retail and street trades or in agriculture, allowed children to fill 
niches in the economy where it was, and is, profitable to use them. 
29. See supra nn. 24-27 and accompanying text. 
30. Greenberger, supra n. 12, at 88-89. 
31. In twenty-two states, students may leave school at sixteen without 
parental consent. See e.g., Ala. Code§ 16-28-3 (2011). Astonishingly, a mere 
twenty-one states limit children under the age of sixteen to three hours of work 
per day during the school year, see e.g. Ala. Code§ 25-8-36 (2011); Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. §23-233 (2011); Cal. Lab. Code§ 1391(a)(2) (2010); and only 
thirty-eight jurisdictions require parental consent for under-sixteens to work. 
U.S. Dept. of Lab., Employment/Age Certification, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/certification.htm (accessed Jan. 29, 2010). 
Only sixteen states mandate parental consent for sixteen-and seventeen-year-
old adolescents to work, three of which only mandate consent during school 
hours. /d. Forty-four states allow children aged sixteen and seventeen to 
work forty or more hours during weeks while school is in session. U.S. Dept. 
of Lab., Wage and Hour Division, Selected Child State Labor Standards, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/state.htm (accessed Jan. 29, 201 0). Thirty states 
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My purpose here is to analyze how American law arrived at this 
laissez-faire position regarding child labor that creates such 
overwhelmingly negative results. This Article proceeds as follows: 
Part Two briefly outlines the history of child labor in the United States 
and early state attempts to regulate its worst abuses. Part Three 
describes efforts until the 1920s by the federal government to limit 
exploitation of youth workers. This Part details the previously untold 
factual and legal history of several important United States Supreme 
Court cases dealing with child labor, especially the famous decision in 
Hammer v. Dagenhart.32 Unearthed from the case record found at the 
Library of Congress, the story of Hammer, and its follow up cases, 
illustrates the litigation strategy of powerful mill owners in North 
Carolina before a hand-picked conservative federal district court judge 
and a Supreme Court determined to block efforts to limit business 
immunity. 
Part Four follows this history to the 1920s and 1930s, detailing 
the struggle to pass a new constitutional amendment and statutes 
restricting child labor. With Locknerism demolished by the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, the passage of the FLSA and its subsequent 
legitimation by a reformed Supreme Court seemed to spell victory 
against employer use of child labor. This victory was, in fact, pyrrhic. 
The weaknesses of the FLSA resulted in the continuation of youth 
employment. These statutory deficiencies were the outcome of a toxic 
combination of factors: profits from cheap labor, entrenched and 
powerful economic interests, and racism. This explanation is most 
dramatically illustrated in the exclusion of agricultural workers, 
including children, from coverage by the FLSA. 
II. HISTORY OF CHILD LABOR REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Formative Period and Subsequent Industrialization 
As with many economic and social issues, the roots of American 
child labor are found in England. The crowded English cities in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were full of crime and poverty.33 
do not even require work or age pennits for youths aged sixteen or seventeen. 
U.S. Dept. of Lab., Employment/ Age Certification, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/certification.htm (accessed Jan. 29, 201 0). 
32. 247 U.S. 251, 251 ( 1918). 
33. Marvin Ventrell, The Practice of Law for Children, 28 Ham line J. Pub. L. & 
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In the eyes of the British rulin class much of this was created by 
Elizabethan Poor Relief Act of 1601 35 dictated that blood relatives 
were the primary source of support for family members but local 
governmental units were responsible for those unable to sustain 
themselves with private resources.36 Public bodies were reluctant, 
however, to spend money for social welfare. As a result, the poor, 
including impoverished children, were often "transported" to the 
developing colonies in the New World.37 A 1627 letter, for example, 
notes "there are many ships going to Virginia, and with them fourteen 
or fifteen hundred children, 'mostly paupers. '"38 
By the late 1700s there was active promotion of the employment 
of children in the quickly-developing cotton industry, which brought 
the industrial revolution to the United States. 39 By 1816, New England 
mills employed 100,000 workers, of whom 24,000 were "boys under 
seventeen" and 66,000 "women and girls."40 Workers in these by now 
large industrial factories were often employed through a "family wage 
Policy 75, 79 (2006). 
34. Catherine G. Trinkley, Child Labor in America: An Historical Analysis, 13 In 
Pub. Int. 59, 63 (1993). 
35. 43 Eliz. Ch. 2, § 7 (Eng. 1601 ). 
36. The Elizabethan Poor Relief Act of 1601 mandated that father and 
grandfather, the mother and the grandmother, and the children of every poor, old, blind, 
lame, and impotent person support that relative to the extent of his or her ability. 43 
Eliz. Ch. 2, §6 (Eng. 1601); see also Robin M. Jacobson, Americana Healthcare Ctr. v. 
Randal: The Renaissance of Filial Responsibility, 40 S.D. L. Rev. 518, 527 (1995). 
37. This would "render [children] useful members of society" and lessen the need 
for the community to support families while husbands were away at sea for long 
periods of time. Elizabeth Lewis Otey, The Beginnings of Child Labor Legislation in 
Certain States II (Amo Press 1974). 
38. Trinkley, supra n. 34, at 64. 
39. In the 1790s, Samuel Slater and his New England partners began a factory 
that combined all stages of manufacture from raw cotton to yarn in one structure. The 
first employees of the factory were nine boys from poor families in the vicinity. In 
contrast to earlier practice these children were factory laborers, rather than apprentices. 
By 1801 , the number of children increased to one hundred ranging in age from four to 
ten. The children became the "little fingers . . . of the gigantic automatons of 
laborsaving machinery." U.S. Bureau of Lab., Charles Patrick Neill, Report on 
Condition of Women and Child Wage-Earners in the United States 48 (Govt. Printing 
Off. 191 0). 
40. American State Papers, Protection to the Manufacturers of Cotton Fabrics, 3 
Finance 83, 14th Cong., I st Sess. (Feb. 13, 1816). 
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system,'' in which all members worked and received one lump sum.41 
Every memb,er of the family above age seven worked in the factory 
from sunrise to sunset, six days a week. Children's wages were 
calculated and graded according to age.42 
Nor was this youth work aberrational. Throughout the colonies 
children worked in various capacities. ''Bound out" children were 
taken in by strangers with the expectation that children would work.43 
Indentured service was a practice inherited from England, based on the 
legal presumption that the child owed service to his or her parent who 
could assign that service to others.44 Apprenticeship involved a 
contract between a parent and another adult promising to provide 
practical training in a trade or craft in exchange for service by the child. 
These ubiquitous arrangements were often more exploitative than 
protective of the well-being of children. Some parents and other 
custodians even advertised the availability of their children to perform 
labor.45 
In sum, children were an integral part of the production process in 
the early United States. The sanctity of work and fear of idleness were 
the accepted rationales for these employment relationships.46 
Children's working was accepted not only to increase production at 
minimum expense but also to control poor and potentially criminal 
elements of society. 
As population and industrialization grew, particularly in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the total number of young 
workers increased dramatically. In the thirty years between 1870, 
41. In New England rural families tended to move to the mill and lived in a 
community built and owned by the company. Hugh D. Hindman, Child Labor: An 
American History 35-36 (M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 2002). 
42. Thomas Dublin, Women At Work: The Transformation of Work and 
Community in Lowell, Massachusetts, 1826-1860 173 (2d ed. Columbia U. Press 
1979)~ A maJe ... headed family with three working children received approximately 
65% of the annual family income from the children's labor. /d. 
43. David Ray Papke, Pondering Past Purposes: A Critical History of American 
Adoption IA,w, 102 W.Va. L. Rev. 459,460 (1999). 
44. This legal concept was to provide a key element in Hammer v. Dagenhart. 
See infra nn. 177-179 and accompanying text. Michael Grossberg, Governing the 
Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth Century America 259 (U. N.C. Press 1985). 
45. Papke, supra n. 43, at 461. 
46. Robert Bremner et aL, Children and Youth in America.~ A Docum,enta.ry 
History, Vol. 1: 1600:..J865 147 (Am. Public Health Assn. 1970) [hereinafter Children 
and Youth VoL 1]. 
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when occupational information about youths ten through fourteen was 
first collected, and 1900, the Census reveals a startling rise in both the 
number and proportion of children entering the labor force. By 1900, 
six percent of children gainfully employed were between ten and 
fifteen years, and there were officially more than 1.75 million youth 
workers in America.47 Children in the post-Civil War South were 
particularly encouraged to work due to the loss of men in battle and the 
desire to provide cheap labor for the new textile mills beginning in the 
South. One-third of the workforce in southern textile mills was 
between ten and thirteen years of age.48 
Another factor contributing to child labor was massive 
immigration. Between 1860 and 1890, over ten million immigrants 
arrived in the United States.49 They joined the considerable number of 
the poor already here. These families faced poverty and chronic 
underemployment. so Parents commonly sent their children to works 1 
and often opposed child labor refortn because of the desperate need for 
additional income.52 Children's work in nineteenth and twentieth 
century America was parental property,53 stemming from the rule that 
47. A total of 1,750,178 children were employed, an increase of one million 
children since 1870. See William Lerner, Historical Statistics of the United States: 
Colonial Times to 1970, U.S. Dept. of Commerce: Bureau of the Census 75-84 (1975). 
48. Employment of children in Southern states in industry became more common 
in the late 1800s as the region's textile industry expanded. By 1900, more children 
worked in southern mills than in any other part of the United States. By 1906, southern 
mills employed an estimated 60,000 children under the age of fourteen. See Stephen 
Wood, Constitutional Politics in the Progressive Era 8 (U. Chi. Press 1 968). These 
figures did not include the many children under the age of ten who were known to be at 
work. /d. 
49. U . S. Citizenship and lmmig. Servs., 2002 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 
11, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2002/ IMM2002.pdf 
(accessed Jan. 29, 20 11). 
50. See e.g., John Modell, Changing Risks, Changing Adaptations: American 
Families in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, in Kin and Communities: Families 
in America 1 19, 128 (Allan J. Lichtman & Joan R. Challinor eds., Smithsonian Press 
1979) (describing child labor in working-class families "as an attempt to pool risks in 
what was experienced as a very uncertain world"). 
51. William J. Cooper, Jr. & Thomas E. Terrill , The American South: A History, 
Vol. 2, 617-619 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2009). 
52. Viviana A. Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value 
of Children 69-10 (Basic Books 1985). 
53. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?: Myer and Pierce and 
the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995, 1059-1061 (1992). 
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parents were legally entitled to their offspring's services. 54 At the end 
of the nineteenth century approximately 400,000 children, five to 
eighteen years of age, were employed in New York alone. 55 
Although the immigrant population remained· largely 
concentrated in urban areas, work by children in agrarian areas was 
also frequently an econo.mic necessity and, indeed, was seen as 
essential to a child's upbringing. From the beginning, the prevailing 
American ethos was that agricultural labor provided training for 
adulthood and independence.56 After the Civil War, however, 
population ,increasingly migrated from rural communities to larger 
industrial cities.57 From 1900 to 1920, the urban population in the 
United States grew by 80%, while rural populations correspondingly 
. 58 . dechned. 
The short- and long-term 
workplaces were often great. 
hazards of work in these industrial 
Unhealthy and dangerous working 
54. Homer H. Clark; The lAw of Domestic R-elations in the United States 
314 (2d ed., West 1988); see Singer v. Brookman, 578 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ill. App. 
1991); Porter v. Powell, 44 N.W. 295, 296 (Iowa 1890); Dembinski's Case, 
120 N.E. 856, 857 (Mass. 1918); Rohm v. Stroud, 194 N#W.2d 307, 308 
(Mich. 1972); Am. Prods~- Co. v~ Villwock, 109 P.2d 570, 579 (Wash., 1941). 
As one state Supreme Court Justice asserted in 1888, "[i]t is a rule as old as 
the common law that the father is entitled to the custody and control of his 
minor children, and to receive their earnings." Eustice v. Plymouth Coal Co., 
13 A. 975, 976 (Pa. 1888). The right of parents to children's services, 
however, correlated to the parent's obligation to support the child. Covey v. 
Eppes, 153 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 1963); Beaudoin v. Beaudoin, 386 A.2d 1261, 
1263 (N.H. 1978). This right is statutory today in many states. See e.g~, Cal. 
Fam. Code § 7503 (West 2011) ("The employer of a minor shall pay the 
earnings of the minor to the minor until the parent or guardian entitled to the 
earnings gives the employer notice that the parent or guardian claims the 
earnings."); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.2 (West 2011); N_.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 9:1-1 (West 2011); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-21-5 (West 2010); R.I. Gen. 
Laws§ 33-15J-l (West 2011 ). 
55. Jeremy P. Felt, Hostages of Fortune 36 (Syracuse U. Press 1965). 
ld. 
56. See infra nn. 359-362 and accompanying text; see also 41st Cong. Rec. 
1552 ( 1907) (statement of Sen. Beveridge): 
This bill does not strike at the employment of children engaged in 
agriculture.- l do not for a moment pretend that working children on the farm 
is bad for them. I think it is the universal experience that where children are 
employed within their strength and in the open air there can be no better 
training. 
57. Wood, supra n. 48, at 1-2. 
58. /d. 
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conditions abounded.59 Workers were obliged to keep 
mechanized production. Women and youth were 
vulnerable. 60 
pace with 
especially 
It is a sorry but indisputable fact that where children are 
employed, the most unhealthful work is generally given 
them. In the spinning and carding rooms of cotton and 
woolen mills, where large numbers of children are 
employed, clouds of lint-dust fill the lungs and menace the 
health ... In bottle factories and other branches of glass 
manufacture, the atmosphere is constantly charged with 
microscopic particles of glass. In the wood-working 
industries, such as the manufacture of cheap furniture and 
wooden boxes, and packing cases, the air is laden with fine 
·Sawdust. Children employed in soap and soap-powder 
factories work, many of them, in clouds of alkaline dust 
which inflames the eyelids and nostrils ... In the coal mines 
the breaker boys breathe air that is heavy and thick with 
particles of coal, and their lungs become black · in 
consequence. 61 
Children as young as eight worked in the mines, which then, as 
now, were one of the most dangerous places to work.62 While 
59. See e.g., Edwin Markham et al., Children in Bondage 63-65 (Hearst's Inti. 
Lib. Co. 1914): 
/d. 
In a Pennsylvania establishment, where the temperature on the outside was 
88 degrees, the temperature at the point where the snap-up rubs off the excess 
glass was I 00 degrees; in front of the glory-hole it was 140 degrees ... The 
speed rate of the snapping-up boy is fixed by the output of the shop, and in 
case of such small wares as one ounce and under he must work with great 
rapidity ... In one factory, ... the distance from bench to oven was one hundred 
feet, and the carry-in boys made seventy-two trips in an hour. 
60. See generally Inland Steel Co. v. Yedinak, 87 N.E. 229, 229-236 (Ind. 1909) 
(thirteen-year old's legs crushed by carload of iron after working eleven hours and 
falling asleep); Sitts v. Waiontha Knitting Co., Inc., 87 N.Y.S. 911 , 911 (1904) (fifteen-
year-old severely injured in rollers of knitting machine); Marino v. Lehmaier, 66 N.E. 
572, 572-573 (N.Y. 1903) (thirteen-year-old's fingers cut off in printing press). 
61. John Spargo, The Bitter Cry of the Children 175-80 (1906), reprinted in 
Robert Bremner et al., Children and Youth in America: A Documentary History, Vol. 
II: 1868-1932) [hereinafter Children and Youth Vol. lfJ. 
62. Louis Hine, a sociologist and photographer working for the National 
Child Labor Committee, noted: "then the pieces (in the coal mines of 
Pennsylvania) rattled down through long chutes at which the breaker boys 
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information gathering was difficult, it is believed that young boys 
under the age of sixteen had twice as many accidents as adult workers, 
while girls had three times as many accidents as adult women.63 
The best known example of this physical carnage is the New 
York Triangle Shirt Waist factory fire in March of 1911 . One hundred 
forty-six garment workers, many as young as fourteen, died in the fire. 
Twelve- and thirteen-year-olds were also known to be working 
fourteen-hour shifts at the factory.64 Death and injury to child workers 
have been a consistent result of the employment of young people in 
America. to the pres_ent day.65 
As child labor increased in number and intensity during the 
nineteenth century, concerns concomitantly arose about the effect of 
this employment on families, children and society. Compulsory 
education was increasingly seen as the antidote to exploitative child 
labor. Early compulsory school attendance laws, however, were 
sat. These boys picked out the pieces of slate and stone that cannot burn. It's 
like sitting in a coal bin all day long, except that the coals is always moving 
and clattering and cuts the fingers." 
Little Comrades Who Toll, 3 Child Lab. Bull. 72 (Natl. Child Lab. Comm. 1914). In 
1902, a minister in Pennsylvania reported "I have seen boys going to the breaker that 
did not seem really able to carry their dinner pail.'' Alan Derickson, Making Human 
Junk: Child Labor as an Issue in the Progressive Era, 82 Am. J. Pub. Health 1280, 
) 281 (1992). 
63. Julie Novkov, Hist:oricizing the Figure of the Child in Legal Discourse: The 
Battle Over the Regulation of Child Labor, 44 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 369 (2000) (quoting 
Edwin Markham, Ben Lindsey & George Creel, Children in Bondage 158-59 (Hearst's 
Inti. Lib. Co. 1914)). 
64. For a detailed description of the deplorable conditions of the factory, the fire 
and ensuing trial, visit Douglas Linder, Famous Trials, 
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/FI'rials/triangle/trianglefire.html (accessed 
Jan. 29, 2011 ). 
65. See The Natl. lnst. for Occupational Safety and Health, Recommendations 
from the NJOSH Child Labor Working Team, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/97-143/ 
(accessed Jan. 29, 2011 ). Fatalities of working youth are far too common, and they 
have the highest rates of injury of any age group. Schulte, supra n. 21, at 404 41 1. 
Work-related injury rates for juvenile workers have consistently been found to be 
between 60%-70% higher than the rates for workers of an ages and second only to 
rates for workers eighteen to twenty-four years of age. 2003 Nonfatal Occupational 
Injuries and Illnesses, supra n. 22; 2004 Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, 
supra n. 22; NIOSH Alert, supra n. 22. Estimates range up to 200,000-plus ado1escent 
workers suffering job-related injuries and illnesses each year, a staggering number. 
NIOSH 2002 Recommendations, supra n. 23, at 7. Work-related illness data is even 
m-ore difficult to document than injuries because of the long latency period often 
associated with these pathologies. 
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limited in scope and lacked enforcement mechanisrns.66 Advocacy of 
legal restrictions on youth employment and of mandatory school 
attendance laws were complementary, and the two movements 
developed simultaneously between 1830 and 1930~67 In the mid-
1800s, . a few states also began setting minimum age requirements to 
work68 and limiting working hours.69 These early child labor 
prohibitions, however, were poorly enforced and rarely followed.70 
B. Reform Efforts and the Progressive Era 
Momentum for child labor regulation increased dramatically in 
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, however, as huge 
numbers of children entered the labor market.71 Beginning with the 
66., While many states in the nineteenth century required some compulsory school 
attendance, they failed to create effective enforcement bodies or to fund regulatory 
agencies to ensure compliance. AdditionaiJy the geography of many of the states 
prevented effective compliance, as did the lack of an accurate census. See MichaelS. 
Katz, A History of Compulsory Education Laws 18-21 (Phi Delta Kappa 1976)~ Age 
was difficult to substantiate from parents and school records were notoriously 
inaccurate. Trinkley, supra n. 34, at 75. 
67. Wayne J. Urban & Jennings L. Wagoner, Jr., American Education: A History 
151-173 (4th ed., Routledge 1999). 
68. Children and Youth vol. I, supra n. 40, at 621. Most minimum ages ranged 
from nine to thirteen years, but since proof of age was not required in any of the early 
minimum age statutes, enforcement was practically impossible. /d. at 627. 
Additionally, a number of these laws al1owed younger children in poor families to 
work under "hardship exemptions." Hindman, supra n. 41; at 62. 
69.. Most of the state laws regulating hours in the mid-1800s limited minor 
workers to ten hours per day. Children and Youth VoL I, supra n. 40, at 628. Many 
hour limitation laws, however, contained a "special contract" provision allowing 
employees to work longer hours. Hindman, supra n. 41, at 62. Another method to 
restrict a young person's employment,-of course, was to mandate . school atten<Jance for 
a portion of the year. Studies indicated that labor at a young age hurt a child's 
development and schooling improved it; contributing to the side by side development 
of the movements. See William Aikman & Lawrence Kotin, Legal Foundations of 
Compulsory School Attendance 45~53 (Kennikat Press 1980). 
70. Felt, supra n. 55, at 6, 17-37 (under-age children were hidden by factory 
owners or by families when inspectors did visit workplaces; look-outs scouted the 
approach of inspectors and if violations of the law were found, employers argued that 
the children's age had been misrepresented to them or the youths were simply visitors). 
71. As in many social welfare issues, the United States lagged behind Europe. 
The first Jaw regulating child labor was approved in Prussia in 1839; France followed 
in 1841. Paul Perigord, The International Labor Organization: A Study of Labor and 
Capital in Cooperation 39 (D. Appleton 1926); Carlos Crespo, When Labor Went 
Global: The Road to the International Lnbor Organization, 37 Rev. Jur. U.P.R. 129, 
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development of the Progressive Movement in the 1890s, school 
systems grew in size and complexity, new techniques of bureaucratic 
control emerged and school officials developed more sophisticated 
techniques to check on, and enforce, school attendance.72 An 
ideological component also surfaced; public schools were to be the 
vehicle . to "Americanize" children, particularly those of immigrant 
parents.73 
The Progressive Movement in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries was comprised of religious organizations, women's 
groups, trade unions and others advocating on behalf of a wide variety 
of reforms.74 In fact, ''Progressivism" was more a set of ideas than a 
disciplined political movement. The legislative agenda included 
restrictions upon child labor, enactment and enforcement of 
compulsory school attendance laws, criminalizing abandonment and 
abuse of children,75 and creating new Juvenile courts to deal with 
"delinquent, acts.76 Child welfare became the focus of the newly 
developing social work profession. 77 
The Progressives had a healthy respect for the power of positive 
law and, as historian David J. Rothman notes, "were not afraid to 
132 (2002). 
72. See generally Kathy Emery, Alternative Schools: Diverted But Not Defeated, 
Paper submitted to Qualification Committee at UC Davis, California, 
http://www.educationanddemocracy .org/Emery /Emery _AltSchoolsPaper .htm (July 
2000). 
73. See Gwendolyn Mink, The Wages of Motherhood: Inequality in the Welfare 
State, 1917-1942 77 (ComeH U. Press 1995). 
74. See generally Wood,-supra n. 48. The-idea of the state as an agency of social 
and economic reform and control was part of Progressive ideology. 
75. There is much contemporary debate today about whether the Progressive 
Era;s child-saving initiatives were more rescue or exploitation. "Orphan trains," 
carrying poor children from large, mainly Eastern, cities were sent to the Midwest to 
live and work with fann families. Critics claim that this transfer removed children 
from parents without valid consent and disregarded the best interests of the child. See 
generally Marilyn Irvin Holt, The Orphan Trains: Placing Out in America 41-79 (U. 
Neb. Press 1994); David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience~· The Asylum and 
Its Alternatives in Progressive America 215 (Little Brown 1980); Papke, supra n. 43 
(discussing Progressive movement). 
76. Chicago established :the first juvenile court in 1899. By the end of World War 
I only three states did not have juvenile courts along with diversion of youth offenders 
from jail to local youth homes and other institutions. David S. Tanenhaus, Juvenile 
Justice in the Making 24 (Oxford U. Press 2004). 
77. Grossberg, supra n. 44, at 278-280. 
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introduce the coercive force of law" in the service of their goals.78 In 
contradistinction to the benign bucolic image of children acquiring 
skills and education through healthful farm labor,79 the Progressives 
recharacterized child labor as exploitative of children and destructive to 
society as a whole.80 As a remedy, they forcefully advocated strong.er 
and more frequent use of the state's parens patriae power.81 State 
actors were to rescue children from unsatisfactory care by parents and 
from forces, particularly economic_, which could deprive youths of the 
schooling and health necessary to become productive adult citizens. 82 
Opposition to youth employment began to build. The growing 
Union movement supported child labor restrictions, partly for 
humanitarian reasons and partly for economic factors relating to adult 
unemplo · ment and the downward drag on wages of masses of child 
78. Rothman, supra n. 75, at 207. 
79. See infra nn. 359-362 and accompanying text. 
80. This was the era of famous urban reformers like Florence Kelly, Jane Adams, 
Jacob Riis, and many others. See generally David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic 
Acts: Amending the U~S. Constitution, 1776-1995 255-261 (U. Press of Kan. 1996). 
81. The "parens patriae" power of the state to protect the child's health, safety and 
welfare was now used to charge parents with abuse and neglect. This legal concept had 
been present in Anglo-American law for centuries. The Elizabethan Poor Laws 
authorized governmental removal of children from parents and outsourcing them as 
apprentices. Massachusetts's records show children removed from homes already in 
the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth century in Virginia. Ventrell, supra n. 
33, at 79. In the nineteenth century, the parens patriae doctrine was a familiar theme 
in state court decisions. See e.g .. , Fletcher v. People, 52 Ill. 395, 397 (1 869); Ex Parte 
Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, ) 1-12 (Pa. 1 839). By 1 905; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
noted: 
Every statute which is designed to give protection, care and training to 
children, as a needed substitute for parental authority ... is but a recognition 
of the duty of the state as the legitimate guardian and protector of children 
when other guardianship fails. 
Cmm.w. v. Fischer, 213 Pa. 48, 56-57 ( 1905). 
82. ''Ignorant and untaught, deprived of childhood and of the benefits of 
consecutive school life, the children in the canneries show little promise of developing 
into citizens more valuable to the state than their immigrant parents." Pauline 
Goldmark, Do Children Work in Canneries 10 (Consumer's League 1910), quoted in 
Novkov, supra n. 63, at 381. 
83. "It is perhaps unnecessary to mention the obvious fact that the child worker is 
in competition with the adult and drags down his wages." Lillian Wald, The House on 
Henry Street 146 (Henry & Hold Co. 1971). Abolition of child labor was inc1uded in 
the constitutions of the Knights of Labor and the Federation of Organized Trade 
Unions, which later became the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Hindman, supra 
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and became a catalytic agent for these legislative efforts.84 Images of 
children working in mines, canneries and textile mills, most forcefully 
portrayed in the photo-journalistic work of Lewis Hine, fostered a 
favorable public climate for restrictions on child labor.85 By 1906, 
forty-two states had some type of child labor legislation.86 
These statutory developments were occurring during the 
Lochner81 era, a time when federal courts were particularly resistant to 
legislation limiting the prevailing "laissez fa ire'' economic theory. 
Child labor restrictions were, of course, promptly challenged as 
unconstitutional violations of "liberty of contract" and government 
interference with the parent-child relationship. While the United States_ 
Supreme Court and the federal courts were hospitable to a variety of 
these constitutional claims, state courts were far less sympathetic to 
these same arguments. State courts tended to uphold protection of 
working children as a lawful exercise of the state's parens patriae 
power. For example, in Inland Steel Co. v. Yedinak, 88 a thirteen-year-
old was employed in the steel mill working six days per week and 
twelve to fourteen hours per day. When his leg was severed in an 
industrial accident he sued for damages under negligence theory, 
premised upon violation of the Indiana law that prohibited under 
sixteen-year-olds working more than sixty hours per week or ten hours 
per day.89 The steel mill argued that the statute violated the Fourteenth 
n. 41, at 49. As a young labor leader in New York, Samuel Gompers pushed for 
regulation of child labor, and later, as President of the AFL, he consistently supported 
child labor reform. /d.; see Felt, supra n. 55, at 10-13, 60, 196-197; Samuel Gompers, 
Laborand the Common Welfare 129 (EP Dutton & Co. 1919). 
84. Walter Trattner, Crusade for the Children: A History of the National Child 
Labor Committee and Child Labor Refonn in America 35 (Quadrangle Books 1970). 
85. See Kyvig; supra n. 80, at 259-261. 
86. 41 Cong. Rec. S 1809-1810 (I 907). 
87. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 ( 1905) (invalidating New York law 
limiting bakers to sixty-hour work weeks). During this period of time, approximately 
1890-1937, the federal judiciary and particularly the United States Supreme Court 
articulated a theory of "liberty;' under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that 
included a "freedom" to contract. It is estimated that more than 175 state laws were 
found unconstitutional in this period. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: 
Principles and Policies 616 (3d .ed., Aspen 2006). At the same time, the Court was 
concomitantly striking down federal statutes as beyond Congress; power under the 
Commerce Clause or as violating the Tenth Amendment. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 
247 U.S. 268, 277 ( 1918) (holding unconstitutional federal statute limiting child labor). 
88~ Inland Steel Co. v. Yedinak, 87 N.E. 229,231 (Ind. 1909). 
89. /d. at 232. 
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Amendment, but the Indiana Supreme Court responded: 
Children under 16 years of age are wards of the state, and 
are pre-eminently fit subjects for the protecting care of its 
police power .... The employment of children of tender years 
in mills and factories not only endangers their lives and 
limbs, but hinders and dwarfs their growth and development 
physically, mentally, and morally. Defendant argues "it 
deprives the defendant of liberty and of its property without 
due process of law" and equal protection ... We think it quite 
obvious that the point is not well taken ... 90 
109 
Numerous other state courts routinely upheld child labor protective 
measures.
91 
Yet these state legislative and court victories rested on an 
unstable foundation. The actual effect on the employment of children 
was often negligible. Lack of governmental enforcement of child labor 
restrictions and compulsory school attendance laws was widespread 
throughout the United States.92 The South was particularly resistant. 
For example, in North Carolina, site of the coming legal battle on 
federal restrictions of child labor, efforts to restrict the minimum age of 
youth workers faced opposition from mill owners employing children 
as young as nine. The destitute parents of these youth workers were 
often likewise opposed. 93 It took until 1904 to limit child labor in 
90. Yedinak, 87 N.E. at 234-235; Fitzgerald v. Inti Flax Twine Co., 104 Minn. · 
138, 145 (1908). 
91. See e.g., Ex Parte Spencer, 86 P. 896, 896-897 (Cal. 1906); Fitzgerald v. Inti 
Flax Twine Co., 104 Minn 138, 146 (1908); Bryant v. Skillman Hardware Co., 76 
N.J.L. 45, 45-46 (1908); People v. Taylor, 192 N.Y. 398, 399-400 (1908); State v. 
Shorey, 86 P. 881, 881-882 (Ore. 1906). 
92. Violators were rarely fined or otherwise punished, and many parents were 
unaware of any restrictions on employing children. Children and Youth, Vol. I, supra 
n. 40, at 628-630. And, in any event, poor parents desperately needed the income from 
their children's work. While southern manufacturing states were setting minimum age 
standards for child labor, none provided means of enforcement of these statutes. In 
North Carolina, for example, the Bureau of Labor Commissioner could only collect 
information from manufacturers through questionnaires, not inspections. To insist 
upon plant visits would question the honesty of the plant owner. Early efforts in North 
Carolina to deterntine the number of children working in factories consisted of mailed 
inquiries to factory owners, who often failed to answer. Elizabeth H. Davidson, Child 
Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States 102, 126 (U. N.C. Press 1939). 
93. Davidson, supra n. 92, at 118, 121. It was estimated that over 10,000 children 
under age twelve were working in textile mills in South Carolina in 1901. In 1904 the 
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North Carolina to over twelve-year-olds and a maximum work week of 
sixty~six hours.94 Even then, younger children classified as apprentices 
were excepted from these Jimits.95 Not until 1918 were children aged 
ten to fourteen required to attend school for the entire school term and 
restricted from the most dangerous worksites.96 Southern mill owners 
successfully harnessed regional resentments and fears to block labor 
law change.97 
Reform efforts varied dramatically across the country. Many 
states had little or no budget for inspections and few effective penalties 
for noncompliance.98 States seeking to attract capital and industry and 
to increase industrial production had incentives to have lax or no 
legislation on youth employment, creating a classic "race to the 
bottom." In 1907, Senator Albert Beveridge of Indiana characterized 
the situation as follows: 
Here is an abstract of the state laws upon the subject of child 
labor. There are not six of them alike. Some have no child-
labor laws at all; others are worse than any laws, because 
they are pretenses at labor legislation which make the people 
and the country think that something has been done, when, 
as a matter of fact, nothing has been done, and the ruin that 
went on before without the sanction of the law continues 
under the sanction of the law .99 
Federal action was the only realistic way to effectively combat child 
labor. 
ill. ACTION ATTHEFEDERALLEVEL 
The first federal legislative action came in 1906, with a proposal 
by Indiana Senator Albert Beveridge and Representative Herbert 
Parson to prohibit interstate shipments from factories and mines 
North Carolina legislature agreed to set the age of twelve as the minimum age of child 
manufacturing workers. 
94. /d. at 1 20. 
95. /d. at 251. 
96. /d. at 76. 
97. Child labor opponents were labeled "Yankees" and their proposed legislation 
as "Yankee doings" in an attempt to use Civil War memories to block refonn. /d. at 
121. 
98. 
99. 
Novkov, supra n. 63, at 373. 
41 Cong. Rec. 1808 ( 1907). 
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employing children under fourteen. 100 As a progressive reformer and 
police commissioner in New York City, Theodore Roosevelt had 
supported limits on child labor, but as President in 1906 he scuttled the 
Beveridge Bill, substituting a federal study of female and child labor in 
its place. 101 Ultimately, the study resulted in at least twenty volumes 
of data and text demonstrating the health, educational and other 
problems associated with employment of these workers.102 In 1912, 
reformers . succeeded in passing legislation creating the Children's 
Bureau, 103 the first federal agency to deal with children. The Bureau 
acted as a research organization on youth issues and developed into an 
advocacy group for reform. 
The first substantive federal regulation of child labor came with 
passage of the Keating-Owen Act in 1916. 104 The Act banned the 
entry into interstate commerce of the "products" of mines, 
manufacturers or other producers who had employed child labor in 
defined categories; 105 children under sixteen working in mines and 
quarries and under fourteen working in factories and some other 
worksites were barred from employment. The statute also limited 
youth between fourteen and sixteen to an e'ight-hour day and a forty-
eight-hour week. 106 
The Act was a symbolic victory, but practically ineffective. 
Foreshadowing later federal enactments, many working children-
especially in agriculture and other worksites were omitted from 
coverage. Owen Lovejoy., chair of the National Child Labor Coalition 
(NCLC) estimated in 1917 that perhaps 150,000 working children were 
100. John Brae man, Alfred J. Beve-ridge and the First National Child Labor Bill, 
60 Ind. Mag of History I, 19-20 (1964). 
101. Pub. L. No. 59-41, § 432, 34 Stat. 866 (1907) (authorized the Secretary of 
Commerce and Labor to "investigate and report on the industrial, social, moral, 
educational, and physical condition of women and child workers in the United States"). 
I 02. 46 Con g. Rec.. 1806 ( 191 I). 
103. Pub~ L. No. 62-116, § 73,37 Stat 79 (1912)~ 
I 04. Pub. L. No. 64-249, § 432,-39 Stat. 675 (1916). The bill passed the House 
by a vote of 237-45, but had been blocked for almost one year in the Senate by North 
Carolina Senator Lee Overman; Trattner, supra n. 84, at 132. 
105. 39 Stat at 675. 
106. /d. Criminal penalties attached to violations of the Act. /d. (first conviction 
10 be punished by a fine of not more than $200 and each subsequent conviction to be 
punished by a fine of not more than $1000 or by imprisonment of not more than three 
months or both). 
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. 
affected by the statute, while 1,850,000 were not.107 No legal remedies 
were provided to workers themselves. But perhaps the most salient 
reason for the Keating-Owen Act's failure was the abject poverty of 
millions of families who desperately needed the income from child 
labor to exist. 108 Reuben Da . e.nhart, nominal plaintiff in a case 
$15.00 per week "he and his brother and sister brought in a total of 
$17.00 per week" to sustain the family. 110 
A. Roland Dagenhart and the Supreme Court 
"Test case" litigation, particularly in the federal courts, has long 
been the weapon of choice for powerful economic and politically 
:conservative forces in the United States. Child labor is but one of many 
examples. 111 Even before the passage of the Keating-Owen Act, 
employers, particularly Southern textile owners, prepared to challenge 
it. David Clark, son of a distinguished Southern jurist1 12 and publisher 
of the Southern Textile Bulletin, organized southern mill owners into 
the Southern Cotton Manufacturers, led by an active Executive 
Committee. 113 Clark was to become the key character in the child 
107. Felt, supra n. 28, at 471. 
I 08. See generally Zelizer, supra n. 52, at 69-71. 
I 09. See generally Hammer, 241 U.S. 251 (1918). 
II 0. Felt, supra n. 28, at 471. 
Ill. See Benjamin R. Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution: How Laissez Faire 
Came to the Supreme Court 241-243 (Greenwood Press 1973) (Conservative Liberty 
League mounts court challenges to laws it had opposed in Congress); Carter v. Carter 
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 340-342 (1936) (invalidating Bituminous Coal Act); A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 541-551 ( 1935) (invalidating National 
Industrial Recovery Act); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 204 (1908) (creating fiction 
that suit against State Attorney General was suit against a private individual, negating 
Eleventh Am-endment prohibition against suits against states in federal courts). 
112. Wood, supra n. 48, at 42. Walter Clark, David Clark's father, was a 
progressive Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court and had been 
considered by President Woodrow Wilson for nomination to the United States Supreme 
Court.ld. 
113. Wood, supra n. 48, at 42, 44-45; Hindman, supra n. 41, at 66-67. In the 
spring of l915, Clark organized the Executive Committee of Southern Cotton 
Manufacturers, hiring former North Carolina Governor W.W. Kitchin to fight passage 
of restrictions on child labor in Congress. Wood, supra n. 48, at 44-45, 48-49; 
Hindman, supra n. 41, at 66-67. ln 1914, North Carolina Senator Lee Overman had 
blocked the Palmer-Owen child labor bill, which had passed the House by a vote of 
237-45, from coming to a vote in the Senate for over a year, but mi11 owners saw that 
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labor litigation drama about to unfold. Upon founding the Southern 
Textile Bulletin in 1911, Clark used the trade journal to lead the 
industry in opposition to government intervention, unionism and other 
"evils."114 His group funded court efforts opposing federal restrictions 
on child labor and vowed to take the fight to the Supreme Court.115 
For this battle, Clark retained John G. Johnson, a brilliant 
Philadelphia corporate attorney and a long-time leader of the American 
bar, who, according to constitutional historian Edward S. Corwin had 
"~haped the American Ba~ As~ociation into a 'sort o.f juristic. sewin~ 
ctrcle for mutual educatton 1n the gospel of Latssez Fatre. '" 11 
Although Johnson was in poor health, he maintained regular letter 
correspondence with Clark, advising him of case strategy. Among his 
most prescient comments to Clark was: "[i]f possible, a judicial district 
should be selected in which the judge is a man of known courage; this 
is no case to try before a weak character."117 After Johnson's death, he 
was replaced by attorney Junius Parker, 118 a partner at O'Brien, 
Boardman, Parker and Fox of New York, one of the best known 
corporate law firms in the country. 119 High powered local counsel 
were also retained, including Clement Manly of Winston-Salem and 
William P. Bynum of Greensboro, North Carolina. 120 
public sentiment was changing. Hindman, supra n. 41, at 66. "Realizing that they were 
unlikely to defeat the child labor bill again, their strategy was to delay its passage and 
'load' the Congressional Record with arguments that could later be used in litigation." 
Hindman, supra n. 41, at 66-67; Wood, supra n. 48, at 48-51. Aside from the 
testimony offered by James Emery, general counsel of the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the Executive Committee was the only group opposed to child labor 
legislation to speak before Congress. Hindman, supra n. 41, at 66-67. 
114. Wood, supra n. 48, at 42-43. 
I 15. Hindman, supra n. 41, at 67. Many mill owners were pessimistic about 
success, but Clark aggressively pursed donations via the Southern Textile Bulletin to 
fund the legal battle. /d. 
116. Wood, supra n. 48, at 82. 
117. /d.at88. 
118. /d. at 85. Parker was also general counsel for the American Tobacco 
Company, a leading litigator, and had participated in the landmark antitrust/monopoly 
suit U.S. v.Am. TobaccoCo.,221 U.S.l06(1911). ld. 
119. /d. The finn's senior partner, Morgan J. O'Brien, was one of a select group of 
lawyers who argued most of the important business litigation heard by the Supreme 
Court. /d. 
120. /d. at 92. Manly and his firm, Manly, Hendron and Womble, were located in 
Winston-Salem. He was also an influential leader of the American Bar Association. 
Bynum was nationally known as one of the ablest southern counsels to appear before 
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Clark and Attorney Parker met on several occasions to discuss the 
upco,ming litigation. Rather than await criminal prosecution of a mill 
for violating the federal Keating-Own Act, which would take time and 
cede the choice of forum, they opted to affirmatively seek an injunction 
on behalf of a child employed in compliance with state law but 
threatened with dismissal because of the federal statute. 121 Clark, the 
Southern Cotton Manufacturers, and their counsel chose James 
' . . . 
Edmund Boy,d, of the Western District of North Carolina, as the most 
promising federal judge.122 Boyd had served in the Confederate Army, 
but later his conservative politics led him to the Republican Party; 
where he had been a member of the Republican National Committee. 
He was personally familiar with Clark's counsei.123 Clark next toured 
Judge Boyd's Western District of North Carolina in search of the 
"perfect combination of factors," and found four potential sets of 
plaintiffs.124 The Dagenhart family was ultimately selected, but had to 
be coaxed to join the lawsuit. 125 
Roland Dagenhart worked for the Fidelity Manufacturing 
Company, a small cotton mill, and had no intention of filing suit before 
he was approached by David Clark.126 Roland had two children who 
would be impacted by the federal child labor law. The older child, 
Reuben, was fifteen, and under North Carolina law could work up to 
eleven hours a day and sixty hours a week. 127 Under the federal statute 
he would be reduced to eight hours a day. The younger Dagenhart, 
John, fourte,en, was working up to eleven hours a day, but under the 
federal law would not be allowed to work at alL Little compensation 
was given to the Dagenharts for their participation in the case, although 
later Reuben would admit that he and his brothers received a few 
the Supreme Court Both firms had prominent lawyers who knew Federal District 
Judge Boyd both in and out of Court. /d. 
121. /d. at 92-93.. This strategy was modeled after the Arizona Anti-Alien case of 
two years prior where the threatened injury of denial of employment resulted in a 
successful injunction against the employer. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 
(1915). 
1 22. Wood, supra n. 48, at 91-92. Boyd had been an Assistant Attorney General of 
the United States in 1897 under President McKinley, and in 1 900 was named to the 
federal bench in the Western District of North Carolina. /d. 
123. /d. at 92. 
124. /d. 
125. /d. at 92-93; Hindman, supra n. 41, at 68. 
126. Wood, supra n. 48, at 93. 
127. /d. 
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bottles of Coca-Cola and automobile rides for the use of their names in 
the lawsuit. 128 
On August 1, 1917, one month before the Keating-Owen Act was 
to go into effect, officials at the Fidelity Manufacturing Company 
posted a copy of the statute in their plant. A week later, on August 9, 
the complaint was filed in Federal Court with Fidelity and William C. 
Hammer, the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina, 
named as defendants. 129 Plaintiff alleged that the Dagenhart boys were 
employed in compliance with the child labor laws of North Carolina, 
and that federal enforcement of the Keating-Owen Act would deprive 
the elder Dajenhart of his vested rights to the services and wages of his 
minor sons. 1 0 It was further alleged that his family was poor, and that 
he (Roland) needed the compensation from his children's labor. 131 
The suit argued the statute was beyond Congress' Commerce Clause 
power because it regulated conditions of manufacturing and 
contravened the Tenth Amendment. 132 In addition, enforcement would 
deprive plaintiffs of liberty and property without due process of law 
under the Fifth Amendment. All these were familiar themes in the· 
constitutional jurisprudence of the Lochner era. 133 
The U.S. Attorney in North Carolina immediately contacted the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) in D.C. to determine if it wanted to accept 
the challenge on the merits or wait for a better case. 134 Reform groups 
urged the DOJ to hire special government counsel for this important 
litigation, and Thomas Parkinson, the director of the Legislative 
Drafting Bureau at Columbia Law School, who had assisted in drafting 
the bill in Congress, was immediately retained.135 Roscoe Pound, 
Dean of the Harvard Law School, was also retained, working pro 
bono.136 
Immediately after the filing of the complaint on August 9, Judge 
Boyd ordered Fidelity Manufacturing and the United States Attorney to 
128. Hindman, supra n. 41, at 68. 
129. Wood, supra n. 48, at 96-97. 
130. /d. at97. 
131. /d. 
132. /d. 
133. See generally Chemerinsky, supra n. 87, at 614-616. 
134. Wood, supra n. 48, at 99. 
135. /d. at I 00. 
136. /d. at 100-IOL 
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show cause within twenty days as to why he should not issue an 
injunction. On August 27, Fidelity filed its Answer to the plaintiffs 
Complaint and was never heard from again at the trial and appellate 
levels. 137 Its response to the Dagenhart's allegations was friendly and 
coope~ative, admittinf all the complaint's factual allegatio~s and .the 
legal tssue at hand. 13 U.S. Attorney Hammer responded 1n succtnct 
fashion on August 29 with a one sentence Motion to Dismiss, asserting 
the law's constitutionality~ 139 That same day, Judge Boyd denied the 
Motion to Dismiss and both sides immediately agreed to . narrow the 
argument to the issue of the constitutionality of the statute. 140 
At the hearing before Judge Boyd on August 30, the Southern 
Cotton Manufacturers' attorneys acting in the name of the 
Dagenharts argued that manufacturing was not part of interstate 
commerce and congressional authority did not extend to productive 
activities. 141 Attorney Bynum supplemented this by discussing the 
nature of child-made goods. 142 While Congress had the power to close 
the channels of interstate commerce to articles injurious to public 
health, morals or safety, it possessed no power over articles that were 
not themselves inherently dangerous. 143 Parkinson led the government 
defense before Judge Boyd, but conceded that the Act was a departure 
from prior legislation. 144 Parkinson's concession was highly 
contentious within the defense team, as Dean Pound and others in the 
DOJ believed that Parkinson should have argued that the Act fit easily 
with prior national police power precedent in the Supreme Court. 145 
137. /d. at 101-102. 
138. /d. 
139. /d. at 102. 
140. /d. 
141. /d. at 102-103. 
142. /d. at I 03. 
143. /d. 
144. /d. at 103-1 04. Parkinson made no effort to deny that the federal legislation 
sought to regulate chi1d labor in manufacturing, and that it departed from prior statutes. 
/d. 
145. /d. at 107-108. In a Jetter dated September 3, 1917, Pound wrote to U.S. 
Attorney Gregory Pound: 
Through an unhappy misunderstanding, the- government did not present a 
consistent case. The district attorney and I understood that we were to argue 
that in principle there was nothing about the law which the Supreme Court 
had not already sanctioned. But Mr. Parkinson did not understand it as we 
did and in his argument conceded the position for which the plaintiffs had 
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Judge Boyd's decision to enjoin the Act came on August 31, but 
he never filed a written opinion.14b In an oral statement to both parties 
endorsing plaintiffs arguments, he found the Act unconstitutional 
because it was not a regulation of interstate commerce and contravened 
the powers of the states under the Tenth Amendment. 147 Judge Boyd 
specifically noted Attorney Parkinson's concession that the Keating-
Owen Act was unprecedented. 148 Congress could regulate trade 
among the states, but not the conditions of labor producing the 
merchandise that was traded. 149 He also spoke at length about the right 
of the progenitor to control the behavior of his progeny, and warned 
about social legislation that placed children in the power of the law or 
police. 150 Judge Boyd then issued a terse injunction, enjoining Fidelity 
from refusing to employ the Dagenhart boys and the United States 
Attorney from attempting to enforce the provisions of the child labor 
bill anywhere in the Western District of North Carolina. 151 
The journey from Judge Boyd's decision on August 31 to the 
United States Supreme Court was brief. On September 1, 1917, U.S. 
for Appeal to the Supreme Court. 15 On September 18, Judge Boyd 
issued a citation to both parties to appear before the High Court on 
October 18, 1918 to present oral argument. 154 
By the time the case was argued before the Supren1e Court, the 
nominal parties, Fidelity Manufacturing and the Dagenharts, were 
absent and only the Southern Cotton Manufacturers and the 
/d. 
been contending ... and asserted that the case was to be a landmark in 
constitutional law. 
146. ld. at 105. In his oral opinion, Judge Boyd did not cite to precedent or 
analyze previous cases. He issued an injunction against following the Keating-Owen 
Act in the Western District of North Carolina. Judge Boyd simplified the issue: "Can 
Congress do by indirection that which it undoubtedly cannot do directly?" /d. at 105-
106. 
147. Wood, supra n. 48, at 105-106. 
148. /d. at 105. 
149. /d. at 106. 
150. /d. 
15 1. I d at I 07. 
152. /d. at 108. 
153. ld. 
) 54. /d. 
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Department of Justice remained to prepare and argue the case. The 
briefs had presented well-rehearsed legal arguments and well known 
precedent. The government stressed Brandeis Brief facts, focusing on 
the health detriments of premature child work.155 It described, for 
example, the alarming percentage of tuberculosis deaths in cotton 
mills: 
... Operatives, thus, of the most youthful age group were 
four times, those of the post puberty were twice, and those 
of the young adult group - 20 to 24 - were about two and a 
half times as liable to die from tuberculosis as were, 
respectively, the girls of like age that did not work in cotton 
mills. 156 
Evidence of loss of education, increases in crime and other ills 
resulting from youth employment were advanced to support Congress' 
legitimate legislative purpose of protecting public health_l 57 The 
government's brief also focused on the inability of states to regulate 
child labor on their own because of the opportunity of employers 
se~king chea~ wages to flee to states _with li~t~e or no regulation of 
chtld labor. 1 8 These employer actions utthzed the channels of 
commerce for unfair competition. 159 
In addition, the government, contrary to Parkinson's concession 
in the District Court, argued that recent constitutional precedent clearly 
supported Congress' power to enact the Keating-Owen Act. Champion 
v. Ames, in 1903, bad upheld a similar federal statute prohibiting 
interstate shipment of lottery tickets, reiecting both Commerce Clause 
and Tenth Amendment challenges. 60 Other federal statutes 
prohibiting transportatio_n of women across state lines for immoral 
) 55. See id. at 145. 
156. Br. for Appellant at 12-13, Hammer, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) in Landmark Briefs 
of the United States Supreme Court: Constitutional Law Vol. 18 (Philip B. Kurland & 
Gerhard Kasper, eds., U. Pub. of Am. 1975) [hereinafter Br. for Appellants]. Even in 
relatively nonhazardous occupations, "the [tuberculosis] rate for the child is more than 
double for the older worker." /d. at 13 (citing Sen. Rpt. 64-358 at 14 (1916)). 
157. /d. 
158. /d. at 23-35. 
159. /d. at 30-35. 
160. 188 U.S. 321, 354-357 (1903) (holding "lottery tickets are subjects of 
commerce and regulation of the carriage of such tickets ... is a regulation of 
commerce"). 
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purposes161 and regulating shipping of adulterated food and drugs162 
were also arguably supportive of Congress' power. State statutes 
limiting child labor had been upheld against Fourteenth Amendment 
challenges because of overriding health and safety concerns and the 
Fifth Amendment attacks should fare no better. 163 
The Southern Cotton Manufacturers' brief164 nominally filed on 
behalf of the Dagenharts concentrated on two constitutional themes 
to which the Court of that period was extraordinarily receptive: fear 
that overweening federal legislative power would eclipse the rightful 
role of state and local governments, and protection of the rights of 
parents over the upbringing and labor of their children. In the 
background lurked the issue of race! 65 If Congress could 
constitutionally control child labor, what could prevent it from 
dismantling state-created racial segregation, 166 repeatedly upheld by 
the Supreme Court?167 Each of these rhetorical gambits played 
important roles in the ultimate decision in Hammer. They pushed the 
161. Hoke v. U.S. , 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913). 
162. Hipolite Egg Co. v. U.S., 220 U.S. 45, 51 (1911 ). 
163. Br. for Appellants at 40-48. 
164. See generally Br. for Appellees at 1, 1-62, Hammer, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) in 
Landmark Briefs of the United States Supreme Court: Constitutional Law Vol. 18 
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Kasper, eds., U. Pub. of Am. I 975) [hereinafter Br. for 
Appellees]. 
165. ld. at 13-14,40 42. 
166. /d. at 40. The brief noted that if national interest and consumer sensitivity 
became the basis for power for Congress to act, it could then act in a variety of issues 
thought to be "national evils" by many people. 
/d. 
It is abhorrent to many people that negroes should not have the same 
industrial opportunities that whites enjoy; therefore Congress may provide 
that no factory which refuses to employ negroes, side by side with whites, 
may ship its goods in interstate commerce ... It is hard to distinguish between 
the fanciful idea of supersensitive consumers ... and the cases in which 
Congress should conclude that it was abhorrent to the moral sense of the 
community to have people engaging in interstate commerce from a State 
which did not permit woman suffrage ... or did not permit the sale of liquor ... 
167. See e.g. Cumming v. Bd. of Educ. , 115 U.S. 528, 545 (1899) (local authorities 
have discretion in allocating funds between black and white schools); Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-552 (1896) (upholding constitutionality of racially 
segregated facilities); The Civil Rights Cases, I 09 U.S. 3, 17-19 ( 1883) (striking down 
federal civil rights statutes): U.S. v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 643-644 (1882) (Congress 
lacked power to make the lynching of black prisoners held by state deputy sheriff a 
federal crime). 
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majority of the Court to distinguish prior precedent, which seemed to 
control the case, and launch a series of confrontations with Congress 
t~at only ended with the Court's 1937 "switch in time which saved 
ntne." 168' 
The Southern Cotton Manufacturers' brief concentrated on the 
structural constitutional division of powers between national and state 
governments. It noted, ostensibly paradoxically, that almost all states 
had, in their own fashion, dealt effectively with the issue of child labor, 
a necessary evi1. 169 National regulation on the topic could not take 
account of the "infinite variations . of climatic, social and other 
conditions" in the United States. 170 Included in these "infinite 
variations" were the differing ages children mature in different 
states; 171 how "negros'' reached physical maturity at an earlier age than 
whites; 172 and how different parts of the country have different cultural 
attitudes towards factory work for women and children. The Keating-
Owen ~ct was thus a fed_eral attem~t to average the climate, wealth, 
and ractal customs of varytng states. 1 3 
The Southern Cotton Manufacturers' brief also argued that if 
Congress could proscribe child labor conditions, what constitutional 
barrier was there to regulation of minimal wages for adults, or federal 
legislation affording the same job opportunities for ''negros'' and 
whites?174 Validation of congressional power over working conditions 
of children would lead to the ''complete elimination of the States as 
political entities"; 175 only the High Court could restrain Congressional 
subversion of our Constitutional structure.176 
168. Chemerinsky, supra n. 87, at 256. 
169. Br. for Appellees, supra n. 164, at I 0. "Not only have states passed statutes 
addressing child labor, but in many of them there have been progressive steps taken to 
protect the health; vigor, and safety of the coming generation". I d. 
170. /d. at 9. 
171. /d. The brief discussed, for example, how Louisiana statutes allowed children 
to marry at age twelve but many other states forbade marriage until later ages. /d. 
172. /d. 
173. /d. at 13. 
174. /d. at 40. 
175. /d. at 14. 
176. See id. at 61-62. 
[B]ut for the FederaJ Government to attempt to create a privileged class of 
citizens of the States who may engage in interstate commerce, or whose 
products may be embarked in interstate commerce, involving, as this does, 
the creation of another class, of whose conduct Congress does not approve, 
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A second major theme of the Southern Cotton Manufacturers' 
brief was protection of parental decision- making over children, 
enshrined in the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.177 This was 
another important constitutional theme of the Court in the 1920s, 
explaining a number of key decisions. 178 This argument was paired 
with the specter of poverty-stricken families unable to use their 
childrens' earnings even in the most dire economic conditions. The 
brief noted that Roland Dagenhart was "a man of small means with a 
large family" for whom "the compensation arising from the service of 
each of said minor sons was essential for the comfort and maintenance 
of the family, including said minors." 179 In addition, the appellees 
noted the disagreement and conflicting arguments the Government had 
presented at the District Court. 180 
At the oral argument in Hammer the courtroom was packed with 
legal and business notables, already in Washington to participate in the 
war effort. All recognized the importance of the case. 181 Solicitor 
General John W. Davis began the oral argument late in the day on 
/d. 
which is denied those privileges, is beyond the limits of the fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice, and not in accordance with the nature of the 
Federal State . . . If our institutions mean anything, and our Constitution is 
more than a scrap of paper, the statement of that suggestion [Congressional 
subversion of our Constitutional structure] carries its own refutation. 
177. /d. 
178. I am indebted to Professor Barbara Bennet Woodhouse for this insight. See 
generally Woodhouse, supra n. 53, at 1113-1117, 1068-1085. "By constitutionalizing 
a patriarchal notion of parental rights, Meyer and Pierce interrupted the trend of family 
law moving towards children's rights and revitalized the notion of rights of 
possession." /d. at 11 1 3. 
179. Br. for AppeJlees, supra n. 164, at 3. 
180. Id. at 23~24. 
/d. 
"In the court below, eminent counsel for the defendant-appellant were in 
disagreement as to the theory upon which this statute was to be 
defended ... One counsel seemed to concede that before commerce in a given 
article could be prohibited ... there must be an evil involved in, or arising out 
of, the commerce .. . The other counsel ... disagreed with this view, because he 
thought it valid and proper for Congress to regulate the prior conduct of the 
persons who desire to engage in interstate commerce ... He represented the 
group who frank I y believe that in this power to regulate commerce there 
resides in Congress a method of regulating the entire conduct of the modern 
man." 
181. Wood, supra n. 48, at 151. 
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April 15, 1918, continuing his presentation early the following day. 182 
Davis immediately drew heated judicial responses to his contention 
that "underlying this statute is the conviction that child labor is always 
and everywhere inherently an evil thing and . all statutes are a reflection 
of prevailing opinion in the public mind." 183 Davis, who had in the 
past been called the "fair haired boy who could do no wrong in front of 
the Court," was forced to repeatedly defend his assertion that legal 
doctrine made permissible what dominant opinion justifiably 
demanded. 184 
The Cotton Manufacturers' arguments, presented by attorneys 
Morgan J. O'Brien and William Hendren, failed to generate the same 
interest from the Justices. 185 However, Chief Justice White repeatedly 
inquired whether Congress had, in passing the Thirteenth Amendment, 
assumed responsibility for the maintenance of a "virile citizenship,'' 
i.e., a healthy and informed citizenry, thus leading to the purpose and 
need for the Keating-Owen Act. 186 Solicitor General Davis saw this as 
evidence of a favorable outcome for the Government. 187 In this 
instance, Davis misinterpreted the Chief Justice's interest, and the 
confidence that he and the child labor refortners felt after oral argument 
was shortly to be proven wrong. 
The Supreme Court's five to four decision, on June 3, 1918, dealt 
a fatal blow to congressional restrictions on child labor. The majority 
opinion distinguished prior legitimation of federal statutes on the basis 
that "the use of interstate transportation was necessary to the 
accomplishment of harmful results [in those cases] ... [t]his element is 
wanting in the present case.''188 The Keating-Owen Act breached 
Congress' constitutional boundary in two ways: "[i]t not only 
transcends the authority delegated to Congress over commerce but also 
exerts a power as to a purely local matter to which the federal authority 
does not extend."189 To allow this regulation would open the door to a 
182. ld. 
183. ld. at 152. Davis believed that in order for the Govemment to win, the 
Justices needed education in the facts and statistics of child labor, rather than in the 
relevant legal principles, which many on the bench had themselves written. /d. at 145. 
184. /d. at 152. 
185. ld. 
186. /d. 
187. ld. 
188. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 271. 
189.. /d. at 276. Approval of the Keating-Owen Act might bring federal control 
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host of unconstitutional usurpations, including the fixing of wages and 
control over children. 190 
The majority opinion tracked Judge Boyd's and the Southern 
Cotton Manufacturers' arguments. While there could be "limitations 
upon the right to employ children in mines and factories in the interest 
of their own and the public welfare" only the states could exercise that 
power. 191 Here the majority, in good Asian martial arts manner, used 
the Progressives' legislative success in passing state restrictions on 
child labor as a weapon against the exercise of power by Congress. In 
concluding, the majority sounded an apocalyptical note. "[I]f Congress 
can thus regulate matters entrusted to local authority ... all freedom of 
commerce will be at an end, and the power of the states over local 
matters may be eliminated, and our system of government be 
practically destroyed." 192 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes penned an eloquent dissent. 
States were free to act on child labor, but the Keating-Owen Act did 
not preempt any state's efforts on this topic. 193 But states' regulation 
of child labor was ineffective precisely because of the disability placed 
upon them by competition from other states and their parochial 
interests. Congress' commerce power was unqualified under the 
Constitution and the legislature, 19~ not the Court, was best able to 
determine what type of regulation of child labor was in the nation's 
best interest. 195 
[I]f there is any matter upon which civilized countries have 
agreed ... it is the evil of premature and excessive child 
over matters that were uniquely subject, under the Tenth Amendment, to the state 
police power and diminish the state's ability to exercise a unique relationship with 
children. /d. 
190. /d. 
191. ld. at 275. 
192. ld. at 276. 
193. I d. at 281 (Holmes, J ., dissenting). States were undoubtedly within their 
power to "regulate their internal affairs and their domestic commerce as they like." /d. 
194. /d. at 280-281 (Holmes, J ., dissenting). Although states could regulate their 
own domestic commerce, "when they seek to send their products across the state line 
they are no longer within their rights." /d . 
• 
195. /d. at 277-278 (Holmes, J ., dissenting). Holmes' dissent also focused on the 
many instances where the Court had upheld regulations passed under the Commerce 
Clause for reasons indistinguishable from the majority's rationale. "Congress's power 
to regulate commerce was unqualified under the Constitution .... " /d. 
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labor. I should have thought that if we were to introduce our 
own moral conceptions wherein in my opinion they do not 
belong, this is preeminently a case for upholding the 
exercise of all of its powers by the United States. 196 
Later, when asked about his "victory" in the Supreme Court, Rueben 
Dagenhart, now twenty, retorted: 
We got some automobile rides. They bought both of us a 
Coca-Cola. That's what we got out of it' he told an 
interviewer. Look at me! A hundred and five pounds, a 
grown man and no education. I may be mistaken, but I 
think the years I've put in the cotton mills have stunted my 
growth. They kept me from getting any schooling. I had to 
stop school after the third grade and now I need the 
education I didn't get. It would have been a good thing in 
this state if that law they passed had been kept. 197 
1 . Impact of the Decision 
Before being explicitly overruled in 1941,198 Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, exerted an important influence on state and federal 
decisions, including those by the Supreme Court. Hammer was relied 
upon by federal circuit and district courts to invalidate a number of 
important federal statutes. These courts used Hammer to hold that 
Congress could not regulate various subjects because they were 
reserved to the states and were not "commerce" for the purposes of the 
Commerce Clause. In addition to lower courts, multiple Supreme 
Court cases cited the decision between 1.918 and 1937. 199 In all, 
Hammer was cited by 151 state and federal cases between 1918 and 
1937.200 
196. ld. at 280. 
197. Hindman, supra n. 41, at 68. 
198. See U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941). 
199. See generally Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 295 (1936); U.S. v. 
Chi., M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 282 U.S. 311,324 (1931); Nigro v. U.S., 276 U.S. 332,339 
(1928); U.S. v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 362 (1926); Brooks v. U.S., 267 U.S. 432, 
438 (1925); United Leather Workers' Inti Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 
U.S. 457, 465 (1924); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 
344, 408 ( 1922). 
200. Results obtained through Westlaw by retrieving the citation for Hammer v. 
Dagenhart and accessing the "citing references" tooL The citing references were 
limited by West1aw' s "limit" tool to court decisions of all jurisdictions issued between 
2010] AMERICAN CHILD LABOR LAW BECAME A CON GAME 125 
In 1934, for example, the District Court of Maryland held the 
National Industrial Recovery Act unenforceable.201 The defendant 
argued that the Act was inapplicable because he did not engage in 
interstate commerce.202 The court cited Hammer as the "only 
necessary obstacle" to a broader conce tion of using the commerce 
another important federal statute, the Public Utility Holding Act, 
unconstitutional. 204 
In other illustrative examples, the Eastern and Western District 
Courts of Missouri relied upon Hammer to find that Congress could not 
regulate manufacturing activities.205 In United States v. National 
Garment,206 the court supported its conclusion that the means of 
production were constitutionally reserved for state regulation by 
quoting extensively from Hammer. 201 A similar approach was taken in 
Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co. v. Nee involving the Bituminous Coal 
Conservation Act. 208 
1918-1937. 
201. U.S. v. Mills, 7 F. Supp. 547,559 (D. Md. 1934), dismissed, 77 F.2d 1019 (4th 
Cir. 1985) (by agreement of counsel). 
202. /d. at 559. 
203. /d. at 549. The court stated that the government's argument to expand the 
Commerce Clause would require overruling Hammer. /d. Also in J 934, the Southern 
District of Illinois held that Congress could not regulate "filled milk" because it could 
not override states' judgments. U.S. v. Carotene Prod. Co., 7 F. Supp. 500, 506 (S.D. 
111. 1934). The court quoted Hammer at length because it showed the Supreme Court 
"endeavoring to protect the states." /d. at 504. Carotene Products involved "the 
precise principle which were (sic) discussed and applied by the Supreme Court" in 
Hammer. /d. at 507. 
204. In re Am. States, 1.2 F. Supp. 667, 699 (Md. 1935). The court described 
Hammer as deciding "constitutional provisions, (that] whether operating by way of 
grant or limitation, are not to be evaded by legislation which, although not in terms 
trespassing upon the letter and spirit, yet in substance or effect destroys, the grant or 
limitation." In reaching its decision, the court quoted extensively from Hammer and 
Bailey v. Drexel. 
205. U.S. v. Natl. Garment Co., 10 F. Supp. 104, 106 (E. D. Mo. 1935); Hume-
S inc/air Coal Mining Co. v. Nee, 12 F. Supp. 801, 804 (W.O. Mo. 1935). 
206. Nat!. Garment, 10 F. Supp. at 108. 
207. /d. 
208. Hume-Sinclair, 12 F. Supp. at 804-805 (also discussing the Child Labor Tax 
cases). See also St. wuis-S.F. Ry. Co. v. Conly, 241 S.W. 365, 367 (Ark. 1922) 
(holding the federa1 government could not "in any manner trench upon or dislodge the 
police power of the states over their own local and internal affairs which are reserved 
to them under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution"). 
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B. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture 
After their defeat in Hammer, the NCLC and the Children's 
Bureau sought to use Congress' power to tax, rather than the 
delegitimized commerce power, to restrict youth e_mployment.209 
Child labor reformers in Congress turned to a different line of 
promising Supreme Court precedent, particularly McCray v. U.S. in 
1904.?10 In McCray Justice White held that the Court was barred from 
inquiring into the motives of Congress in tax matters.21 1 White, of 
-course, had been in the-majority in the five to four Hammer decision 
and thus might be swayed to uphold a child labor tax. No 
congressional hearings were held before passage of the 1918 Tax 
Revenue Act,212 which included a 10% excise tax on the net profits of 
businesses using prohibited child labor, defined in the same terms as 
those used in the invalidated Keating-Owen Act.213 The Tax Revenue 
Act also empowered the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service 
209. The months after the Dagenhart decision were tumultuous for child labor 
reformers. Some wanted to await a shift in the Court's view of federa1ism before 
' . . 
attempting federa1 legislation again. Others contemplated ways to circumscribe 
judicial review and diminish the Court's power or some advocated for a constitutional 
amendment. Senator Kenyon considered a bill that used the congressional powers over 
mail to regulate child labor. See Wood, supra n.48, at 188-193. 
210. McCray, 195 U.S. 27. 
211. In McCray the Court upheld a federal tax levied on margarine products, a 
victory for producers of competing spreads and Congress' power under Article I, § 8, 
Clause 1. Justice White noted: 
App1ying this rule to the acts assailed, it is self-evident that on their face they 
levy an excise tax. That being their necessary scope and operation, it follows 
that the acts are within the grant of power. The argument to the contrary 
rests on the proposition that, although the tax be within the power, as 
enforcing it will destroy or restrict the manufacture of artificially colored 
oleomargarine, therefore the power to levy the tax did not obtain. This, 
however, is but to say that the question of power depends, not on the 
authority conferred by the Constitution, but upon what may be the 
consequence arising from the exercise of lawful authority. 
/d. at 59. 
212. Wood, supra n. 48, at 1 96. 
213. Keating-Owen Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 249, 39 Stat. 675 ( 1916), invalidated, 
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 25 f ( 1918). The language of the Keating-Owen Act 
was mirrored in the 1918 Tax Revenue Act, further fueling opposition arguments that 
the Tax Act was not intended for tax revenue purposes, but to regulate manufacturing 
prohibited by the Hammer decision. Compare Keating-Owen Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 
249,39 Stat. 675 (1916), invalidated, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) with 
the 1918 Tax Revenue Act, Ch. 18, Title XII, 40 Stat. 1057 ( 1919), invalidated, Bailey 
v. Drexel, 259 U.S. 20 ( 1922). 
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to inspect facilities to ensure employer compliance with the terms of 
the Act.214 Reformers believed that the High Court could not overturn 
the Tax Revenue Act without reversing McCray. 
Even before the tax was enacted, Clark mobilized the Southern 
Cotton Manufacturers to challenge it. The strategy, as before, was to 
use a father and son as plaintiffs in a suit, again before District Judge 
Boyd. After another search in the Western District of North Carolina, 
Clark solicited Eugene T. Johnston, an emplo ee at the Atherton 
W. Johnston, then fifteen, would have had his hours reduced, Johnston 
agreed.217 On May 2, 1919, Johnston v. Atherton Mills was heard 
before Judge Boyd, argued by Clark's coworate lawyers fresh from 
their success in Hammer v. Dagenhart.21 The issue was decided 
almost before the case began. Immediately after the plaintiffs' attorney 
commenced his opening statement,219 Judge Boyd announced that the 
statute was unconstitutional, and that no further argument was 
necessa . Congress was once more infringing upon the rights of the 
was solely in favor of the Johnstons.221 
Given the narrowness of the order, the U.S. District Attorney 
chose not to pursue the case further. Clark and the Southern Cotton 
Manufacturers had been counting. on the Government to appeal the 
case, and when it failed to do so, Clark brought Atherton Mills back 
before Judge Boyd to file an appeal to the Supreme Court. Clark's 
attorneys now argued that Atherton had the right to fire John Johnston 
because of the 1918 Tax Revenue Act.222 When the Supreme Court 
214. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 276, 1200,40 Stat. 1057, 1203 (1919). 
215. Atherton Mi11s was one of the many mills owned by D.A. Tomkins, another 
opponent of child reform efforts both in North Caro1ina and nationally. Tompkins was 
well known for speeches maintaining that over-indulgence and slothfulness contributed 
as much harm to children as child labor. He also campaigned aggressively in North 
Carolina to allow lower ages for working children operating in an apprenticeship 
capacity. See Hindman, supra n. 41, at 55, and Davidson, supra n. 92, at 157. 
216. See Hindman, supra n. 41, at 70. 
217. /d. 
218. Wood, supra n. 48, at 221. 
219. /d. at 229. 
220. /d. at 228 (citing Transcript of Record at 12, Atherton v. Johnston (April 23, 
1919)). 
22 J. /d. at 221. 
222. See id. at 230. 
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agreed to hear the appeal, Atherton invited the Department of Justice to 
defend the constitutionality of the child labor tax, which it did. 223 
Ath,erton Mills v. Johnston was argued at the Supreme Court on 
December 10, 1919.224 There is no record of the oral argument. By 
this time, however, John Johnston had turned sixteen and the 
controversy seemed moot. By 1920, with still no ruling, both sides 
were becoming nervous. Clark had hoped for an early decision 
because by April 1920 mills were required to file tax returns admitting 
or denying liability for the 10% child labor tax. 225 Still there was 
silence from the High Court. 
The reason for the delay in Johnston has never been determined. 
Some have speculated that Chief Justice White was the reason for the 
lack of a decision. For White the issues of the case straddled a 
doctrinal fence: the government's heavy reliance in its brief upon his 
opinion in McCray meant either finding differences between that case 
and Johnston in order to overturn the 1918 Tax Revenue Act, or 
reversing his own decision of two decades earlier.226 White, moreover, 
was in rapidly failing health.227 
Finally, as the parties studied the poor financial results from two 
years of enforcement of the Tax Revenue Act, 228 in the spring of 1921, 
the High Court ordered re-argument for the following October~ Only 
weeks into newly-elected President Warren Harding's term, Chief 
Justice White died on May 19, 1921. His replacement was former 
President William Howard Taft. From his past writings and 
speeches,229 Clark and the Southern Cotton Manufacturers were 
223. /d. at 231. 
224. Atherton Mills v. Johnson, 259 U.S. 13 (1922). 
225. See Hindman, supra n. 41, at 71. 
226. Wood, supra n. 48, at 242. 
227. /d. at 241. 
228. The Bureau of Internal Revenue had allocated $90,000 for enforcing the Act in 
its first year of operation. In that first year, however, it only collected $2,000 in fines. 
Wood, supra n. 48, at 253. By the time the Supreme Court ruled the Act 
unconstitutional three years later, the tax had cost over $300,000 to administer, while 
raising approximately $41 ,000 in revenue. The National Committee of Child Labor 
noted these disappointing results, and was especially worried about the problems the 
discrepancy would cause. Hindman, supra 11. 41, at 72. 
229. See Br. for Appellees, supra n. 164 at 57. The Southern Cotton 
Manufacturers' lawyers quoted President Wilson's compilation of "Lectures on 
Popular Government'; published in 191 3: 
If the power to regulate commerce between the states can be stretched to 
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confident Taft was a reliable fifth vote in their favor. In the fall of 
1921 the Johnston case was argued for a second time, but now was 
joined by two other cases manufactured by the mill owners and decided 
by Judge Boyd, Vivian Mills v. J. W. Bailey230 and Bailey v. Drexel. 231 
These new cases had interesting litigation histories. Clark and his 
counsel had been deeply concerned about the jurisdictional deficiencies 
of their Johnston test case, so they had again scoured the Western 
District for a cotton mill that had resisted the 10% tax penalty.232 
Finding none, Clark turned to other manufacturers for a test case.233 
He utilized a list obtained from the Internal Revenue in Raleigh, North 
Carolina, listing manufacturers recently assessed the 10% penalty 
under the Tax Act.234 Meanwhile his lawyers, Manly and Hendren, 
wrote President Harding's new Solicitor General, James M. Beck, 
suggesting the Johnston case be delayed due to the "probability of a 
case being docketed during the early months of the term which will be 
free from any question of jurisdiction."235 Beck, eager to decide the 
constitutional issue, agreed. 236 
In October of 1921 Clark's lawyers assisted the Drexel Furniture 
Company in submitting a petition for a tax refund and initiating another 
federal suit before Judge Boyd.237 To expedite the case, U.S. Solicitor 
General Beck instructed the new District Attorney for Western North 
Carolina, F.A. Linney, to file a demurrer, asserting the child labor tax 
was constitutional. On December 10, 1921, the case was heard in 
North Carolina's Western District Court. Unsurprisingly, Judge Boyd 
once more immediately ruled against the government. 
Breaking with his past practice of orally rendering opinions from 
the bench, this time Boyd drafted an opinion. He ignored the Supreme 
/d. 
include the regulation of labor in mills and factories, it can be made to 
embrace every particular of the industrial organization and action of the 
country... . . May Congress also regulate the conditions under which 
merchandise is produced? Clearly not. 
230. See Hindman, supra n. 41, at 72. 
231. /d. 
232. Wood, supra n. 48, at 260. 
233. /d. 
234. /d. 
235. /d. at 261. 
236. /d. 
237. /d. at 264. 
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Court precedent in McCray,238 holding that "the necessary result of the 
statute must be taken into consideration, even if that result is not in so 
many words either enacted or distinctly provided for. In whatever 
language a statute may be framed, its purpose must be determined by 
its natural and reasonable effect."239 Relying on his Summer 1921 
decision in George v. Bailey240 and ignoring Supreme Court precedent 
that held a federal suit could not be entertained to restrain a tax, Judge 
Boyd re-asserted that states were the only entities able to address child 
labor: 
By comparing the federal and state statutes it will be readily 
seen that the latter affords as much protection to the health 
and physical condition of children as the former ... [i]nstead 
of undertaking as the federal act, to make the income of an 
establishment using child labor illegally, the subject of 
taxation, it denounces as a criminal offense the violation of 
its provisions ... 
[F]or this reason the state statute is undoubtedly more 
capable of prompt execution than the act of Congress, and 
the expenses incident to it when compared to that of the 
federal plan, must necessarily be a great dealless.241 
In this Bailey v. Drexel decision all the interested parties the 
Government as well as Clark and his Textile Manufacturers now had 
a viable case to ensure the High Court would address the 
constitutionality of the 1918 Tax Revenue Act. 
238. See supra nn. 210-211 and accompanying text. 
239. Drexel Furniture Co. v. Bailey, 216 F. 452, 454 (W.D. N.C. 1921). 
240. George v. Bailey, 214 F. 639, 644 (W.D. N.C. 1921). This case is also known 
as the Vivian Cotton Mill or Vivian Spinning Mill case. Its convoluted facts did not 
make it an attractive test scenario for Clark's lawyers. In 1919, while operating under 
the name of Vivian Cotton Mills, the Internal Revenue of North Carolina assessed the 
owner, Mr. George a $2,098 fine for illegally employing children. Attempting to rid 
himself of this liability, the ownership of the company was transferred to a new entity, 
the Vivian Spinning Mills. The North Carolina Tax Collector, Bailey, demanded the 
money and threatened to seize the property and dispose of it by sale. The Mill filed a 
lawsuit, requesting that Bailey be enjoined from acting because the Child Labor Tax 
was unconstitutional under the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. The Supreme Court had 
previously held in McCray, 195 U.S. at 54 (1904), that no federal suits could be 
entertained to restrain a tax; rather reimbursement must be sought. Judge Boyd waived 
this "technicality" to issue an injunction against Bailey. George, 247 F. at 642; see 
Wood., supra n. 48, at 265-266. 
241. George, 214 F. at 643. 
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At the March 8, 1922, oral argument in the Supreme Court in 
Bailey v. Drexel, Solicitor General Beck was subjected to repeated hard 
questioning, forced to defend the discrepanc~ between the cost of 
administering the tax versus its small income.242 Chief Justice Taft 
was particularly hostile, demanding that Beck explain how the Court 
should determine congressional intent for the statute and the limits of 
federal regulatory authority over production in the states.243 Most 
observers felt the argument went badly for the Government and Beck 
himself acknowledged this in a letter to Chief Justice Taft after the 
decision.244 Child labor reformers were already suspicious of Beck's 
commitment and advocacy efforts. Weeks before his argument to the 
Supreme Court, Beck told the St. Louis Bar Association that he heartily 
approved of the Dagenhart decision, and believed that if courts 
continued to sustain congressional taxation without inquiry into motive 
"little will be left of the rights of the State."245 
The Court's final blow came on May 15, 1922. Bailey v. 
George246 was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and failure to exhaust 
all grounds for equitable relief. The Johnston case was determined to 
be moot,247 but in Drexel v. Bailey the Court ruled the Child Labor Tax 
unconstitutional.248 Chief Justice Taft, notoriously pro-business,249 
found that the law represented a penalty, not a tax, and thus the Court 
was not inquiring into Congress' motives:250 
242. Wood, supra n. 48, at 273. 
243. ld. 
244. /d. at 274. Beck later wrote Taft: 
/d. 
[Y]ou may be surprised to know that, although I presented the Government's 
contention in the Child Labor Case as strongly as I was able, yet none who 
heard you deliver the opinion may have welcomed the decision more than I. 
Had the Court adhered tenaciously to the views of the late Chief Justice 
White in McCray v. United States, our form of government would have 
sustained a serious injury. 
245. Wood, supra n. 48, at 269. 
246. Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16, 20 (1922). 
247. Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13, 16 ( 1922). 
248. Bailey v. Drexel, 259 U.S. 20, 44 ( 1922). 
249. Taft was notoriously pro-business as a Justice and politician. See Roderick 
M. Hills, Jr., The Federalist Capers, Legal Affairs, 
http://www .Iega1affairs.org/printerfriend1y .msp?id=820 (accessed Feb. 6, 2011 ). 
250. Bailey, 259 U.S. at 36. "But there comes a time in the extension of the 
penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes 
a mere penalty, with the characteristics of regulation and punishment. . . . The case 
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[G]rant the validity of this law and all that Congress would 
need to do hereafter, in seeking to take over to its control 
any one of the. great number of subjects of public 
interest ... would be to enact a detailed measure of complete 
regulation of the subject and enforce it by a so-called tax 
upon departures from it.251 
Justices Brandeis and Holmes acquiesced in the majority's 
opinion~ much to the surprise of child labor opponents. Justice Clarke 
dissented without an opinion.252 Congress' taxing power was now 
equally as impotent as its commerce power to legitimate federal 
legislation on child labor. 
IV. FEDERAL ACTIVITY IN THE 1920'S AND 1930'S 
A. The Twentieth Amendment 
Few today, other than professional historians, know about the 
intense struggle that raged during the 1920s and 1930s, ultimately 
unsuccessful, to pass a constitutional amendment giving Congress and 
the states power to limit or prohibit child labor under the age of 
eighteen. Similar to the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment in the 
1970s and 1980s, the failure to pass a constitutional amendment 
marked a significant setback for a set of ideas and the grou s 
joined by some Catholics, were able to frame the debate in terms that-
divorced from the realities of child labor resonated with many voters 
and political representatives. To its opponents, the proposed Twentieth 
Amendment was an assault on parental authority, states' rights and 
· traditional American values. 
before us cannot be distinguished from that of Hammer v. Dagenhart." /d. at 37-39. 
251. Id. at 38. 
252. /d. at 44. 
253. The opposition included women's groups that had opposed the Nineteenth 
Amendment grant of suffrage to women, e.g., Sentinels of the Republic, The Woman 
Patriots, and other conservative organizations, such as the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and some American Catholics. 
See Riva Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 947-948 (2002). See generally 
Bill Kauffman, The Child Labor Amendment Debate of the 1920s; or, Catholics and 
Mugwumps and Farmers, IO J. Libertarian Stud. 139, 152 (1992) (describing 
federalism and states' rights issues in the consideration of the Twentieth Amendment). 
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With the Supreme Court blocking any congressional statute, a 
constitutional amendment was the only possible path for federal 
intervention on child labor. Samuel Gompers, President of the 
American Federation of Labor (AFL), noted that "the Supreme Court 
deals with childhood exactly as it would deal with pig iron ... [A] 
constitutional amendment is needed to complete the work quickly."254 
This idea had been previously floated; meetings had been held at AFL 
headquarters between Gompers, Florence Kelly of the National 
Consumers League, representatives of the National Child Labor 
Committee and others to discuss wording.255 Ultimately, the proposed 
amendment read: 
Section 1. The Congress shall have power to limit, 
regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen 
years of age. 
Section 2. The power of the several States is unimpaired 
by this article, except that the operation of State laws shall 
be suspended to the extent necessary to give effect to 
legislation enacted by the Congress.256 
Two days after the decision in Bailey v. Drexel, Representative 
Roy Fitzgerald of Ohio introduced a resolution in the House endorsing 
the proposed constitutional amendment.257 The forces favoring the 
amendment initially seemed formidable; all three political parties-
Republican, Democratic and Progressive were officially in support. 
The proposed amendment had endorsement across the political 
spectrum, from conservatives like Massachusetts Republican Senator 
Henry Cabot Lodge to Progressive Senator Robert LaFollette.258 Non-
governmental groups like the National Child Labor Committee, the 
National Consumer Union and others had already had ~reat legislative 
success, in the states on child labor and allied issues. 59 Each 1924 
presidential candidate supported the measure. 260 Proponents of the 
254. Samuel Gompers, Let Us Save the Children, 29 Am. Federationist 413, 413-
414(1922). 
255. Marvin Levine, Children for Hire: The Perils of Child Labor in the United 
States 29 (Greenwood Publishing Group 2003). 
256. 66 Cong. Rec. 3212 (1925). 
257. Trattner, supra n. 84, at 162. 
258. Kyvig, supra n. 80, at 257 ~ 
259. See supra nn. 83- 91 and accompanying text. 
260. Novkov, supra n. 63, at 374. 
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amendment were optimistic about the possibility for early ratification 
and, indeed, the process in Congress was quick and decisive. By the 
' 
summer of 1924, both the. House (297-68) and the Senate (61-23) had 
approved the measure.261 
Even at this early stage, however, it was clear that a powerful 
opposition was forming and a grab bag of negative arguments being 
collected that would ultimately doom the amendment. In hearings 
before congressional committees, employer groups challenged the 
appropriateness of federal action, arguing that regulation of child labor 
was best left to the states- even though employers actively opposed 
restrictions at that levet262 Another rhetorical gambit, drawn from 
common law principles, was the threat of loss of parental rights o.ver 
children263 to . a power-hungry, and, in the future, socialist/communist 
gov:ernment. The use of the phrase "labor of persons under 
eighteen ... " in Section I of the proposed amendment, rather than 
''employment" or "employment relations," provided fuel for a firestorm 
of arguments that parental authority was about to be supplanted by 
government and that children would no longer have the educational and 
disciplinary benefits inherent in work. 
The proposed amendment would give to Congress the power 
to forbid any farn1 boy from milking a cow or even driving 
in a cow from the pasture until he is eighteen years old. 
Under its sweeping provisions it might and probably would 
be made illegal for sister Suzie to wash a dish or sew on a 
button until after her eighteenth birthday .264 
And while the Palmer raids and the Red Scare of 1919-1920265 had 
abated by the mid-1920s, fear of a left-wing takeover of the United 
261. lABOR: A 20th Amendment? Time Mag. (Jan. 5; 1925). 
262. Joan Aldous, The Political Process and the Failure of the Child lAbor 
Amendment, 18 J. Fam. Issues 71,76 (1997). 
263. "The state has no jurisdiction over the child merely because it is a child, and 
no earthly power can delegate such privilege to the state. The divine law, as we11 as the 
invincible law of nature, prescribed the rights and duty of parent and chi1d centuries 
before nations were known and governments fonnulated." 66 Con g. Rec. 3212 ( 1 925) 
(read from an article submitted by Senator King). 
264. Trattner, supra n. 84, at 284. 
265. The legal and political developments during the "Red Scare" are described in 
Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime 220-226 (W. W. Norton & 
Co. 2004). 
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States remained strong,266 and the proposed amendment was branded 
as "communist. "267 
Not least among the opponents to the amendment were the 
Sentinels of the Republic, the Women Patriots, and other groups that 
had played a significant role in the campaign against suffrage for 
women. These groups came together to resist what they saw as 
attempts to attack the traditional American home and family.268 
Harriet Frothingham, a prominent Women's Patriots leader (and losing 
plaintiff in Frothingham v. Mellon269) expressed her opposition to 
proposed 1920s reforms as a triplet of socialist bills to cover education, 
maternity and infancy, and child labor; " ... [T]he bills are different, but 
the backers are always the same, with the same objective, nationalized 
care, control, and support of mothers and children."270 Equally as 
266. This was a period of American and European intervention in the civil war 
going on in the former Tsarist Russian empire. The newly-emergent Bolshevik 
Revolution was seen as a threat to the existing economic and political order throughout 
Europe and North America. William D. Guthrey called the amendment a 
"communistic effort to nationalize children." WiHiam D. Guthrey, The Child Labor 
Amendment: Argument in Opposition to Ratification 36 (1924), quoted in Woodhouse, 
supra n. 53, at I 066. 
267. The Citizens Committee to Protect Our Homes and Children called the 
Amendment a keystone in the Communist Program and the "brainchild" of Lenin's 
mistress. In 1933, the President of the American Bar Association called it "a 
communist effort to nationalize children ... " Kauffman, supra n. 253, at 140. 
268. See Mustering Sentinels of the Republic! Natl. Magazine (Oct. 1922) 
(discussing leadership of the Sentinels of the Republic). 
269. Cmmw. of Mass. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 , 487 (1923) (taxpayer lacked 
standing to bring suit to enjoin federal statute providing funding to reduce maternal and 
infant mortality). 
270. 67 Cong. Rec. 12,919, 12,930 (1926). The Women's Patriots noted: 
[it] has been shown that the "worst form of communism" as Senator 
Kingwell calls it, is found in the feminist phase of communism arousing 
women against men, wives against husbands and providing community care 
for children, legitimate and illegitimate, to ''remove the economic 
foundations of monogamous marriage. 
/d. at 12,946. See generally Kauffman, supra n. 253 (describing issues of federalism 
and states' rights in debates over the proposed amendment). The President of the 
American Bar Association claimed that the Amendment was "a communistic effort to 
nationalize children, making them primarily responsible to the government instead of 
to their parents." /d. at 140. Congressman Fritz G. Lanham likewise mocked the 
Amendment as enjoining children to "obey your agents from Washington, for this is 
right. Honor thy father and thy mother, for the Government has created them but a 
little lower than the Federal agent. Love, honor, and disobey them." Jeffrey A. Tucker, 
The Trouble With Child Labor Laws, Mises Daily (Feb. 11, 2008). 
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damaging to the campaign for enactment of the Child Labor 
Amendment was opposition from Catholic Church organizations and 
laypersons. Many in the clerical hierarchy and laity saw the proposal 
as a threat to parochial education and parental control over children.271 
Despite quick and decisive approval of the amendment in 
Congress, ratification efforts in the states quickly ran into a buzz saw 
of opposition. A few states ratified quickly, but a defeat in 
Massachusetts proved decisive in 1924. Action in the Massachusetts 
legislature was deferred to provide a vote in a referendum, allowing 
opponents to organize effectively. In particular, the Catholic hierarchy 
in Massachusetts vigorously opposed the amendment as a continuation 
of initiatives in other states restricting parochial education and as an 
expression of the power of the resurgent Klu Klux Klan (KKK).272 
Nor was the Massachusetts opposition simply composed of 
Catholics. The President of Harvard, A. Lawrence Lowell, was active 
in organizing ~stablis~ment Protestants t~ opEose Congress' authority 
amendment as choking off the supply of child labor.2 ~ An even more 
ominous development in the Massachusetts referendum campaign was, 
for the first time in the history of the struggle to restrict child labor, 
explicit resistance from the American Farm Bureau Federation and 
other agricultural groups.275 This reflected concern that child labor, 
whether on small family farms or on the large corporate entities then 
transforming American agriculture, would become unavailable~ 
Opposition from the agricultural interests was to prove critical in 
numerous coming battles.276 
271. Woodhouse, supta n. 53, at 1062. 
272. See Kauffman, supra n. 253, at 144. The KKK' s extreme anti-Catholic views 
prevented New York Governor AI Smith from being nominated for President on the 
Democratic ticket in 1924. The head of the Massachusetts Catholic Church, Cardinal 
O;Connell, was particularly wary of federal power, fearing Congress could pass a law 
subjecting schools and teachers to federal control and banning parochial schools. 
Aldous, supra n. 262, at 82. In the run up to the 1924 Massachusetts referendum, 
Cardinal O'Connell instructed all pastors in his archdiocese to read a pastoral letter 
warning that the Child Labor Amendment would shift control over children to the 
federal govemm.ent, reminiscent of Soviet Bolshevism. /d. 
273. Kauffman, supra n. 253, at 160. 
274. Aldous, supra n. 262, at 83. 
275. /d. 
276. Farm groups opposed the ratification effort in the states of the Child Labor 
Amendment and later successfully lobbied against the inclusion of fann workers in 
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The rhetoric of the anti-ratification campaign in Massachusetts 
and the organization of opposition groups proved wildly successful. 
The referendum resulted in a defeat by an almost three-to-one 
majority .277 Soon afterwards, New York's legislature tabled the 
amendment and by early 1925, only four of the state legislatures where 
the amendment was pending had approved it. The first wave of 
ratification action had resulted in a crushing defeat. The Child Labor 
Amendment was not to surface again until the depths of the Great 
Depression. 
B. Developments in the Great Depression 
With the nation mired in the greatest economic crisis of its 
history, and the newly-elected President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
(FDR) promising a "New Deal," Congress assed the National 
included re-employment of idle workers, creation of decent wages, and 
prevention of ruinous and unfair competition. Child labor was viewed 
as a significant factor in each of these economic problems.279 Under 
the NIRA, the President was authorized to approve "codes of fair 
competition" that would further the "public interest."280 The codes set 
rules on trade practices, prices, wages and hours.281 Most of the codes 
prohibited children under eighteen from performing "hazardous work" 
and set minimum age requirements. 282 The very first NIRA Code 
protective New Deal labor statutes, such as the National Industria] Recovery Act, the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the Social Security Act, 
and others. See infra nn. 354-363 and accompanying text. 
277. Aldous, supra n. 262, at 76. 
278. Natl. Indus. Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 67, Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 196 (1933). 
279. See Ella Arvilla Merritt, Trend of Child Labor, 1927-1936, Mthly. Lab. Rev. 
1371, 1371 (Dec. 1937); see Margaret H. Schoenfeld, Analysis of the Labor Provisions 
of the N.R.A. Codes, Mnthly. Lab. Rev. 574, 574 (Mar. 1935). 
280. Natl. Indus. Recovery Act, supra n. 278. 
281. Over 7,000 such codes for different industries were developed. Violations of 
these negotiated codes constituted a criminal misdemeanor punishable by fine. /d. 
282. Kyvig, supra n. 80, at 307. By the end of 1933 more than I 00 codes had been 
adopted; almost all banned employment under the age of sixteen. /d. at 308. The 
NIRA was responsible for blocking I 00,000 child laborers under the age of sixteen 
from the work force. When the statute was declared unconstitutional, those children 
went back to work. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937: Joint Hearings on S. 2475 
and H.R. 7200 Before the S. Comm. on Educ. and wbor and the House Comm. on 
Labor, 75th Con g. 1483-85 ( 1937) (remarks of Hon. Francis Perkins, Secretary of 
138 WHIITIER JOURNAL OF CHILD AND FAMILY ADVOCACY [Vol. 10:1 
banned employment of children under sixteen in cotton textile mills, 
the_ venue for previous constitutional attacks on federal child labor 
limits.283 
The Supreme Court, however, quickly moved to block many parts 
of the New Deal, including restrictions on youth employment. On 
"Black Monday," May 27, 1935, it declared the NIRA unconstitutional 
in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. 284 The child labor provisions 
were not specifically at issue, but the High Court found the entire 
statute ''attempted regulation of intrastate transactions" that affect 
interstate commerce ''only indirectly."285 The Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1933 (AAA), as amended in 1934,286 allowed the Secretary of 
Agriculture to create child labor standards as a prerequisite to payment 
of federal benefits to growers of beet and sugar cane, crops where child 
labor was particularly omnipresent. The Court held that statute 
unconstitutional in 1936 in U.S. v. Butler.281 When the AAA was in 
force, child labor in the sugar beet fields was sharply reduced, but after 
the statute's invalidation, large numbers of children under fourteen 
returned to work.288 As a result of the High Court's decisions in 1935 
. . . 
there was a 55% increase from the previous year in employment of 
fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds. Two and one-half times as many 
children left school in 1936 to take low income jobs as in the previous 
year.289 
Labor). 
283. The impact of the NIRA on the cotton mills, scene of the prior litigation on 
the constitutionality of federal child labor restrictions was particularly noteworthy. See 
supra n. 282 and accompanying text. See also Andrew J. Samset, Child Labor and the 
New Millennium, 21 Whittier L .. Rev. 69, 75 ( 1999). 
284. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495,521 (1935) (upholding 
a Second Circuit decision that held unconstitutional wage and hours provisions 
regulating the wholesale pou1try trade because Schechter's Market was not in interstate 
commerce). 
285. /d. at 551. The court also found the Act was an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power to the President because it provided no standards to be 
administratively applied. ld. 
286. Agricultural Adjustment Act, Pub. Law No~ 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 ( 1933) (as 
amended May 9, 1934, 48 Stat. 670). 
287. U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (holding states have the power to 
regulate agriculture, and Congress could not indirect1y accomplish the AAA goals by 
taxing and spending to purchase comp1iance on matters in excess of its Commerce 
Clause powers)~ 
288. Trattner, supra n. 84, at 210. 
289. George E. Paulsen, A Living Wagefor the Forgotten Man 61 (Susquehanna U. 
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Judicial invalidation of New Deal laws, including restrictions of 
child labor, helped to create a referendum on President Roosevelt's 
policies in the 1936 national elections. The result was unequivocal; 
Roosevelt received 523 electoral votes to eight for Alf Landon, and 
Democratic control of Congress was strengthened.290 Emboldened by 
this national vote of confidence, FDR moved quickly after his second 
inauguration in 1937. Roosevelt's "court packing plan" proposed 
legislation to increase the size of the Supreme Court by one for each 
sitting Justice over age seventy, up to a maximum of fifteen Justices.291 
The proposal, however, drew intense opposition, including from 
Democrats concerned about the independence of the federal 
judiciary. 292 It never came to a final congressional vote. 
But, by the spring of 1937, Supreme Court decisions reflected 
different views on a number of key constitutional issues. In West 
Coast Hotels v. Parrish,293 the Court approved a state statute requiring 
minimum wages for women, a retreat from its prior position on state 
protective labor legislation. The Supreme Court similarly u held the 
the argument that it regulated manufacturing, a matter constitutionally 
reserved to state authority by prior Court precedent.295 Since the 
manufacture of steel and other products was now deemed to be in the 
"flow" of interstate commerce, it was evident that previous negative 
rulings on Congress' statutory power to restrict child Iabo~96 might be 
overruled in future cases. 
• 
Press 1996). 
290. Marian C. McKenna, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Great Constitutional 
War: The Court Packing Crisis of 1937 243 (Fordham U. Press, 2002). The 1936 
election was the most lopsided electoral victory in the history of American presidential 
contests. /d. 
291. Chemerinsky, supra n. 87, at 255-256. 
292. /d. 
293. See 300 U.S. 379, 386 ( 1937). 
294. See Jones v. Laughlin Steel Corp., 30 I U.S. 1, 47 ( 1937). 
295. See e.g. A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) 
(finding NIRA unconstitutional as violation of state control of Jocal industry); U.S. v. 
E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) ("[c)ommerce succeeds to manufacture and is 
not a part of it.") 
296. See e.g. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 273. 
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C. TheFLSA 
The country was, by 1937, overwhelmingly opposed to child 
labor; public opinion polls showed a large majority in favor of the 
Child Labor Amendment.297 Reformers saw their opportunity and a 
number of political-legal approaches were proposed. Some, in and out 
of the administration, favored aggressively pushing for passage of the 
Child Labor Amendment. Low wages, adult unemployment, depressed 
consumer spending and massive child labor had created a new burst of 
activity on the proposed Twentieth .Amendment in the 1930s; by 1937 
twenty-eight states had ratified the amen_dment, leaving it Just _eight 
short of passage.298 Labor Secretary Perktns299 and others30 beheved 
only this solution could ultimately solve the problem. These forces 
believed child labor needed to be eliminated from both intrastate and 
interstate employment, which could only be accomplished by a 
constitutional amendment. 
Other leaders endorsed the idea of a separate federal statute 
dealing exclusively with youth workers to avoid the political 
complexities created by the general wage and hour provisions, as well 
as administrative issues arising from the proposed FLSA.301 Senator 
297. Paulsen, supra n. 289, at 65. ~~Public opinion polls revealed that substantial 
majorities favored national regulation of labor standards, with 68 percent favoring an 
8-hour day, 63 percent supporting minimum wages, and 82 percent favoring a child-
labor amendment." /d. 
298. Novkov, supra n. 63, at 395. Hold-outs included almost all of the south, 
except for Kentucky and Arkansas~ /d. 
299. Paulsen, supra n. 289, at 86-87. At joint congressional hearings, Perkins 
testified that the child labor prohibition in the proposed FLSA was commendable, but 
she still favored the Child Labor Amendment. /d. Perkins asked Roosevelt to delete 
. . . . . . . . 
the child labor ban from the comprehensive labor standards bill, but Roosevelt refused 
in order to make the labor standards measure easier to get through Congress. /d. at 77. 
300. /d. at 90. Chief of the Children's Bureau, Katherine Lenroot, likewise 
testified that since the NIRA' s invalidation the number of children working had risen 
sharply and many were employed ·in intrastate industries. /d. Because any proposed 
statutory prohibition would only cover a small number of working children she 
continued to urge passage of the Child Labor Amendment. /d. AFL President William 
Green, after commenting on conditions in New Jersey silk mills employing thirteen-
and fourteen-year-olds, said ratification of the Child Labor Amendtnent was the only 
solution. /d. at 67. 
30 I. After an extensive question-and-answer session with Senator Black on 
the FLSA, Senator Edwin Johnson (Colorado) noted~ 
The real question before the Senate is: ShaH it consider the very important 
chHd-labor problem in a separate bill. . . . Why should the Congress inject 
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Barkley (D. Ky.) sponsored the Childrens' Bureau bill dealing solely 
with child labor.302 Others, however, including FDR himself, believed 
that child labor issues should be part of the overall labor bill that 
ultimately became the Fair Labor Standards Act.303 This was 
ultimately the strategy that prevailed. 
The story of the battle to enact the general wage and hour 
provisions of the FLSA has been well-told elsewhere.304 The child 
labor provisions were a side show in the general struggle for passage, 
but decisions made during this battle have impacted the history of child 
labor in the United States to this day. On May 24, 1937, President 
Roosevelt recommended that Congress pass legislation establishing 
national labor standards. In addition, Roosevelt noted, "a self-
supporting and self-respectin:ff democracy can plead no justification for 
the existence of child labor." 05 
That same day the FLSA was introduced by Senator (later 
Supreme Court Justice) Hugo Black (D. Ala.) and Representative 
Connery (D. Mass.). The bill provided for national regulation of 
the regulation of child labor, which is relatively simple, into all the 
complexities and uncertainties of the wage and hour bill? Is it possible that 
child labor has been added to this wage and hour bill to obtain public 
sympathy for a program over which there is great difference of opinion and 
controversy .... [I]t is not fair .... 
82 Cong Rec. 7633-68 (1937). 
302. Paulsen, supra n. 289, at 77. 
303. See generally Franklin D. Roosevelt et al., The Public Papers and Addresses 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Constitution Prevails Vol. 6, 209-218 (The Macmillan 
Co. 1941). 
The reason the child labor section was included with the wage and hour 
legislation instead of forming a separate act was because of the feeling that it 
had a better chance to be declared constitutional as an integral part of general 
legislation intended to remove the burden of unfair labor practices on the free 
flow of interstate commerce. Alone, child labor may not be a very great 
burden, but when considered with the other factors, it has a better chance of 
surviving attack in the courts. 
John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 L. & 
Con temp. Probs. 464, 487 ( 1939). 
304. See generally Forsythe, supra n. 303; Paul H. Douglas & Joseph Hackman, 
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1839, I, 53 Political Sci. Q. 491, 491-492 (1938) 
(hereinafter Douglas & Hackman I]. 
305. Roosevelt, supra n. 303, at 210-212 (citing the dissent in Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, Roosevelt declared that the power of Congress over interstate commerce 
gave it power over child labor). 
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wages, hours and other conditions of employment306 and banned 
''oppressive child labor," i.e., employment of children under the age of 
sixteen or between sixteen and eighteen in "hazardous occupations.-"307 
These youth employment provisions approximated the 1916 Keating-
Owen Act and the 1919 Child Labor Excise Tax enactment. The 
. . . 
congressional battle for passage of the FLSA was lengthy, lasting more 
than a year and encompassing two regular, and one special, sessions of 
Congress. It was also procedurally and politically extraordinarily 
complex~ 
As the bill worked its way through the House ofRepresentatives, 
the child labor sections varied. 308 The original provisions were 
progressively weakened;: fourteen- and fifteen-year olds not working in 
manufacturing and mininffi were now permitted to work except under 
"oppressive" conditions.3 9 This, of course, opened the door for 
employment of under;-sixteen-year-olds until the present day. Sixteen-
and seventeen-year-olds were allowed to work in all but "particularly 
hazardous" occupations. 310 Administration of the child labor 
provisions was placed in the Children's Bureau. 311 
Despite concessions on these and other issues, the House Rules 
Committee, dominated by Southern Democrats and Republicans, 
blocked consideration of the entire measure, preventing any action 
during the first regular session of the 75th Congress. In response, 
306. Douglas & Hackman I, supra n. 304, at 493-499 (The administration biJl 
proposed to give a broad mand3;te to an Administrative Board with powers over labor 
and management. It would set minimum wages, maximum hours, and a host of other 
provisions. The Board was to be composed of five men appointed from civil-service 
lists and confirmed by the Senate. The Board would appoint a director for each state. 
Hearings were to be conducted locally. Before deterntining minimum wages and 
maximum- hours the Board was required to receive advice from a committee 
representing labor, industry and the public and also to provide notice and hearings for 
. . 
interested parties. Criticism of this administrative approach included claims that it had 
the broadest government authority granted; in peace-time, to a person( s) other than the 
President). 
307. /d. at 504-506. 
308. /d. at 497. 
309. Section 203(1) of the Act allowed employment of fourteen- to sixteen-year-
olds if the Secretary of Labor determined such work was confined to periods which 
Hwill not interfere with their schooling and to conditions which will not interfere with 
their health and well-being." 29 U.S.C.S. § 203(1) (2010). 
310. Douglas & Hackman I, supra n. 304; at 497. 
311. Paul H. Douglas & Joseph Hackman, The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 
II, 54 Political Sci. Q. 29, 52 (1939) [hereinafter Douglas & Hackman II]. 
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President Roosevelt called a special session to begin November 15, 
1937, but the bill was stalled there as well by the same conservative 
coalition. 312 
In the second regular session of the: 75th Congress, Roosevelt 
agreed to significant changes in labor standards in an attempt to 
appease southern Democrats.313 The child labor provisions remained a 
"sweetener" to help ensure passage of the Act.314 In the end, the 
critical events driving passage of the FLSA were probably more 
explicitly political. Soon after the victory of two New Deal supporters 
in Spring 1938 primaries, 315 a petition to discharge the bill from the 
Rules Committee, where it had again been bottled up, obtained the 
needed 218 signatures in less than three hours. Within a few weeks the 
House voted 291 to 89 in favor of the FLSA, and it was passed by the 
Senate without a record vote~ 
D. The Impact of the FLSA on Child Labor 
The impact of the FLSA's passage on the use of child labor, 
however, was negligible. The Supreme Court itself quickly recognized 
the Act's limited reach. In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. 
Lenroot,316 it narrowly construed the statute to exclude transmission of 
telegraph messages from the ban on a producer's shipment of ''goods" 
in interstate commerce. The Court noted: "[s]o far as coverage was 
concerned, all proponents were aware that any of the suggested 
ve~sions of legislation would reach only a small fraction of existing 
child labor."317 
312. Douglas, & Hackman I, supra n. 304; at 508-511. 
313. /d. at 514-515. 
314. Felt, supra n. 28, at 474-475. The President believed he would "get more 
votes from conservative Congressmen if the wage and hour provisions [were] ... made 
more palatable by integration with child labor." /d. Senator Wheeler noted child labor 
"was put on the bill ... because it was desired to say to senators, 'When you vote 
against this bill your are also voting against the prohibition of child labor."' I d. 
315. Douglas & Hackman I, supra n. 304, at 511-512 (on January 4, 1938, in the 
Alabama Democratic primary, Senator Lister Hill, a supporter of the FLSA and other 
New Deal legislation, won a decisive two to one victory against the anti-New Deal 
candidate. On May 3, 1938, Senator Claude Pepper, another pro-FLSA candidate, 
handily defeated his opponent in Florida). 
316. 323 U'.S. 490, 502-503 ( 1945). 
317. /d. at 495-496. 
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Soon after passage of the FLSA, the_ United States entered World 
War II and even the limited child labor protections were eviscerated. 
When a labor shortage emerged as males entered the armed services, 
women entered the work force in large nu,mbers318 but youth were 
affected even more dramatically. According to the Department of 
Labor (DOL), "[c]ontrary to general belief, the early withdrawal of 
boys and girls from school was a greater factor in the expansion of the 
labor force than was the increase in the number of women working."319 
Following the outbreak of the war, school enrollment fell by 24% for 
fifteen- to eighteen-year-olds, while the number of fourteen- to 
seventeen-year-aids employed increased by 200%.320 By 1945, U.S~ 
Census samples showed approximately 3.5 million youths employed 
full- or part-time, three to four times the number in 1940.321 
Further, in 1942 the Secretary of War requested that the DOL 
provide an exemption to the eighteen-year-old minimum age limit for 
hazardous occupations, which the DOL granted.322 Work accidents 
involving children rose 100% from 1942 to 1943.323 The Increase both 
to the rise in the number of children employed and to the sharp increase 
in children employed in hazardous jobs. 324 Presaging modem trends, 
the type of work performed by young people during the war shifted 
from primarily agriculture to a balance between farming, 
manufacturing, and services_.325 
The weaknesses of the child labor provisions of the FLSA were 
• 
318. Bureau of Lab. Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Lab., Sources of Labor Supply for the 
War, 57 Mthly~ L. Rpt. 212, 212-213 (1943). 
319. I d. at 212. 
320. Natsuki Aruga, HAn' Finish School": Child Labor During World War II, 29 
Lab. History 498 (1988) (school enrollment for fifteen- to eighteen-year-olds fell by 
1.2 million, and employment of fourteen- to seventeen-year-olds increased by over two 
million). 
321. Bureau of Lab. Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Lab., Teen-Age Youth in the Wartime 
Labor Force, 60 Mthly L. Rpt. 6, 8 (1945) [hereinafter Teen-Age Youth in Wartime 
Labor]. Nationally, youth not attending school worked an average of forty-six hours 
per week. /d. at 15. 
322. Aruga, supra n. 320, at 519. 
323. See id. at 498. 
324. See id. at 512. 
325. Teen-Age Youth in Wartime Labor, supra n. 321, at 11. In April 1944, six 
times as many workers between the ages of fourteen and seventeen worked in 
manufacturing, and over seven times more worked in service jobs than in 1940. Aruga, 
supra n. 320, at 509. 
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apparent from the outset. Some deficiencies were, and are, apparent 
from the face of the statute itself, e.g., exclusions from coverage, 
allowance of work by most fourteen- to eighteen-year-olds, and lack of 
effective administrative resources or remedies for injured working 
youth~326 The safety and health issues were particularly egregious. 
Previous decades had produced a lengthy and richly documented 
history of death, injury, and disease produced by child labor.327 These 
issues were fully discussed at the FLSA committee hearings, but the 
statute did not mandate any reporting of work-related injuries and 
deaths, safety training for youth workers, or adult supervision. Other 
problems, such as lack of administrative enforcement, only became 
evident later. 
Despite its symbolic importance, the FLSA's actual effect upon 
child labor in the United States was slight. Contemporary writers 
estimated only 30-50,000 youth workers under sixteen were covered 
out of a total of 850,000 non-farm children then employed.328 In 
addition, 1930 Census data indicated one-half million worked on 
farms; these were entirely excluded from the Act.329 Historian Jeremy 
Felt estimated only 25% of youth in non-agricultural occupations and 
only 6% of the total number of under-sixteen-year-old workers were 
affected by the passage of FLSA. 33° Children in industrial agriculture, 
intrastate industries, the street trades, messenger and delivery service, 
stores, hotels, restaurants, beauty parlors, bowling alleys, filling 
stations, garages, et cetera, were outside the law. 331 Even worse, the 
law did not apply to many sectors of the economy where the most·. 
dramatic abuses of child labor were concentrated. 332 
326. See infra nn. 344-345 and accompanying text (no private right of action under 
the FLSA for children injured while working in violation of federal law). 
327. See supra nn. 99-103 and accompanying text (congressional study of female 
and child labor produced nineteen volumes of reports and data on the problems 
produced by employment of theses groups). 
328. Katharine Du Pre Lumpkin, The Child wbor Provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 6(3) L. & Contemp. Probs. 391, 405 (1939). The Act did" ... not begin 
to deal with child labor as a mass problem. It touches at best 6 percent of these 
younger employed children." /d. 
329. See infra nn. 351-352 and accompanying text. 
330. Felt, supra n. 28, at 477-478. 
331. See Du Pre Lumpkin, supra n. 328, at 402-403; Jonathan Grossman, Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum Wage, 101 Mthly 
Lab. Rev. 22, 29 ( 1978). 
332. See Du Pre Lumpkin, supra n. 328, at 402-403. 
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In this regard, the FLSA followed the pattern of previous federal 
child labor restrictions, which likewise had little practical impact. The 
1916 Keating-Owen Act had excluded most ·workplaces where youth 
workers were concentrated333 and there had. been little enforcement 
against employers.334 The NRA Codes in the Great Depression 
applied princi~ally .to. specified in~ustrial faciliti~s. where youth were 
often absent.3 ~ Stmtlarly, the chtld labor provtstons of the Walsh-
Healey Public Contracts Act of 1937336 and Sugar Act of 1937337 were 
directed at relatively small pockets of child labor. 
Aside from exclusions from coverage, the FLSA failed to 
effectually control child labor between the ages of fourteen and 
eighteen. The Act bans "oppressive child labor,"338 but the definition 
varies with the age of the child, the industry,-the type of job, parental 
involvement, schooling and other factors. While sixteen is the usual 
·minimum age for emplo~ment, the Act lowers the minimum age to 
fourteen in many cases.339 The FLSA provided no authority to 
regulate the number of hours or the time sixteen- and seventeen-year-
olds could work. 340 These adolescents may be compelled to work long 
hours and late into the night, conditions almost certain to impair their 
studies. When all these exemptions are tallied, millions of American 
children are working legally today.341 
Lack of meaningful remedies was another significant deficiency .. 
333. See supra nn~ 104-llO and accompanying_ text. 
334. See supra nn. J 04-11 0; Katharine Du Pre Lumpkin & Dorothy Wolff 
Douglas, Child Workers in America 61 (Robert M. McBride & Co. 1937). 
335. See Felt, supra n. 28, at 473. 
336. 4 I U .S.C.S. § 35 (20 1 0). 
337. Pub. L. No. 75-414, § 30 I, 50 Stat. 903, 909 ( 1937). 
338. 29 U .S.C.S. §§ 203, 212 (20 1 0); see 29 C.P.R. § 570.102 (20 10). 
339. 29 C.P.R. § 570(a)( I )(i) (" ... employment is confined to periods which will 
not interfere with their schooling and to conditions which will not interfere with their 
health). The Regulation restricts youth between fourteen and fifteen years of age to no 
more than three hours of work per day and eighteen hours of work per week when 
school is in session. 29 C.F.R. at § 570.35. However, many youth work far more 
hours. 
340. See Schmidt v. Reich, 835 F.Supp. 435, 444 (N.D. IlL 1993). 
341. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Young Workers Safety and Health, 
Selected Charts on Young Worker Employment, Injuries and Illnesses, Figure 2, 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/youth/chtpkgfig2.html (accessed Feb. 7, 2011). In 
2007, there were 2.6 million employed youth between fifteen and seventeen years of 
age. /d. 
2010] AMERICAN CHILD LABOR LAW BECAME A CON GAME 147 
Primary reliance was placed on criminal sanctions, but not one 
prosecution was ever brought. 342 The combination of a heightened 
mental requirement, need for a repeat offense, and the minimal 
sanction quickly rendered criminal enforcement useless.343 The Act's 
civil sanctions were similarly toothless. No civil penalties were 
included for violations. Individuals and the agency were given the 
right to pursue claims for unpaid minimum wage or overtime, 344 but 
only the DOL may enforce the safety and health provisions of the 
FLSA. Enforcement by the parties most likely to bring suit an 
injured youth and their families is thus unavailable.345 
Moreover, administrative enforcement of the child labor 
provisions was almost non-existent from the beginning. Only $50,000 
was appropriated for the Children's Bureau in 1939 to enforce the child 
labor provisions.346 The Wage and Hour Division, given jurisdiction 
to administer the general wage and hour provisions, had twenty-three 
inspectors in 1939, despite the fact that 603 were estimated to be 
needed.347 Given a workforce of approximately one million children, 
and the agency's responsibility for adult conditions of employment, it 
was apparent from the outset that there would be little or no 
342. Ran LEXIS tenns and connectors search of the following: "29 pre/5 216a" 
retrieving sixteen results, none of which dealt specifically with child labor law 
violations (last search Sept. 12, 2008). 
343. Darby v. U.S., 132 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1943) (conviction requires 
~'deliberate, voluntary and intentional" conduct, or actions with reckless indifference to, 
or disregard for, the Act's requirements). uWillfulness is deliberate and purposeful 
failure to comply with Fair Labor Standards Act." /d. Violation is willful if act of 
"defendant is deliberate, voluntary, and intentional"; mere mistakes or inadvertency is 
insufficient to show willfulness. Nabob Oil Co. v. U.S., 190 F.2d 478, 480 (lOth Cir. 
1951 ). "Violation is willful only if employer knew or showed reckless disregard as to 
whether its conduct was prohibited." Brock v. Richland Shoe, 779 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 
1986). 
344. 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 216(b)(2010), 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 216(c)(2010) (provides 
employees with a cause of action for back wages, liquidated damages, attorney's fees, 
and litigation costs). § 216(b) provides for a jury trial. Lori liard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 
580 ( 1978). Liquidated damages are calculated by doubling the amount of unpaid 
minimum wages or overtime awarded to the plaintiff. See e.g. Coston v. Plitt Theaters, 
831 F.2d 1321, 1328-1330 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 ( 1988) (ADEA 
case following FLSA precedent). 
345. See e.g. Henderson v. Bear, 968 P.2d 144, 146 (Colo. App. 1998) (finding 
FLSA violations provide no basis for implying private cause of action). 
346. Paulsen, supra n. 289, at 135. 
347. /d. 
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enforcement. And after a year of operation, the Children's Bureau had 
managed to . hold just ?~e heari~g on t~e need for the promu)1ation ~f 
Hazardous Orders, crtttcal for tmprovtng health and safety. 48 Thts 
administrative lethargy proved to be a harbinger of the future lack of 
enforcement. 
E. The Agricultural Exclusion 
One of the most important exclusions from coverage by the 
FLSA . that of agricultural workers reflected structural factors in 
American public life that go to the heart of efforts to produce social 
change in any period. The FLSA' s treatment of farm workers reflected 
the complicated and interwoven effect of ideology, economic and 
political power, and our own "American Dilemma" race.349 The 
administration's 1937 proposed bill excluded agriculture and 
contained, in the sponsor's own words, "the most comprehensive 
definition of agriculture ever formulated~ "350 
348. DuPre Lumpkin, supra n. 328, at 396-397. The only hearing concerned the 
explosives industry. 
349. See generally Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem 
and American Democracy 809 (Harper & Row 1944). Myrdal' s study of race relations 
in America detailed the obstacles to full participation in American society of African-
Americans. ld. The "dilemma" of the title referred to the coexistence of American 
liberal ideals and the denial of civil, economic, and political rights to African-
Americans. /d. at 794. The "negro problem" was ultimately a white man's problem. /d. 
at 587. 
350. 81 Con g. Rec. 7648 ( 1937) (statement of Senator Black, Chief Senate sponsor 
·of the FLSA). Section 3(f) of the FLSA contained the following definition of 
agriculture: 
"Agriculture" includes farn1ing in all its branches and among other things 
includes the cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying1 the production, 
cultivation, growing and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural 
commodities (including commodities defined as agricultural commodities in 
section 15(g) of the Agricultural Marketing Act, as amended), the raising of 
livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals, or poultry, and any practices (including 
any forestry or lumbering operations) performed by a farmer or on a fann as 
an incident to or in conjunction with such fanning operations, including 
prepara:tion for market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for 
transportation to market 
Pub. L. No~ 75-718, § J(f), 80 Stat 833, 833-834 (codified as-amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 203(t) ( 1982)). This broad exclusion included any "practice incident 
to farming.'' /d. 
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Congress was fully aware that by 1930 agriculture was "the most 
serious child labor problem in the United States,"351 employing 61% of 
all child workers ten- to sixteen-years old, and 87% of children aged 
ten to fourteen.352 At the time of the initial passage of the FLSA in 
1938, farm laborers adult and youth were among the poorest 
workers in the country and they remain so today.353 Their exclusion 
from the FLSA is explained at one level by simple political reality. 
Two key voting blocs farm state and southern Congressmen would 
have torpedoed any labor reform measure that included workers in 
those sectors.354 As Representative Hartley commented: 
Political expedience rather than relief for the exploited 
workers of America has dictated the terms of this 
bill ... [W]hy is it that the poorest paid labor of all, the farm 
labor ... has been omitted from this bill? The answer is that 
the votes of the farm block in the House, the best organized 
351. Davin Curtiss, The Fair Labor Standards Act and Child Labor in Agriculture, 
20 J. of Corp. L. 303,309 (1994-1995). 
352. /d. 
353. A U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Study showed that the annual average wage for 
farm workers between 1935-1939 was $410 without board and $312 with board at that 
time. This sum was approximately one-half of the minimum wage of $806 per year set 
by the FLSA. According to the most recent National Agricultural Workers Survey 
(NA WS), the 2000-2001 median family income for farm workers (including income 
from a11 sources, not just fann work) was in the range of $15,000-$17,499 per year, or 
$288-$337 in gross wages per week. Thirty percent of all fann workers, according to 
NA WS, had total family incomes below the poverty line. Dept. of Lab., A 
Demographic and Employment Profile of United States Farm Workers, Findings from 
the National Agricultural Workers Survey 2001-2002 xi, 
http://www .doleta.gov/agworker/report9/naws_rpt9.pdf (March 2005). 
354. 83 Cong. Rec. 9257 ( 1938). Historian Carey McWilliams noted that fann 
workers were historically excluded from political centers of power and that 
[m]ost of our social legislation has been enacted as the result of a political 
'deal' between organized labor and farm groups. The basis of this deal has 
always been 'we the far rn representatives' will not object to this legislation, 
if you, the representatives of organized labor, will agree to exempt farm 
employees. 
Carey McWilliams, Farm Workers and "Dirt Farmers" Need Power, in New Deal 
Thought 251, 254-255 (H. Zinn ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1965). In addition, 
Southerners dominated Congress and controlled key committees essential to enactment 
of President Roosevelt's progressive statutes. They were intent on protecting the 
existing Jim Crow economy in the South and its attendant white supremacist ideology. 
Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimination 
in the New Deal, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1335, 1351 ( 1987). 
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block we have here~ would have voted against the bill and 
defeated it. 355 
The exclusion of agricultural workers was also a reflection of the 
power wielded by large agricultural interests in Congress and state 
legislatures. Lobbyists from The Grange, The Farm Bureau 
Federation, and other organizations representing big agribusiness were 
ubiquitously present duri,hearings and _oth~r legislative processes in 
the passage of the FLSA. 3 6 These organtzattons argued farmers could 
not afford to pay minimum wages or comply with safety regulation. 
Such requirements "would make it virtually impossible for the farmer 
to secure hired help within his reach."357 
Abandonment of agricultural workers, inc.luding children, in the 
FLSA was part of a larger legislative pattern excluding them from 
numerous other protective statutes. 358 A number of factors combined 
to produce this result. Ideology was at work; from the founding of the 
Republic, work on farms was idealized as healthful, educational, and 
an example of the uniquely American spirit.359 In 1910, in proposing a 
bill to limit child labor, Senator Albert Beverage noted that his intent 
was not to "strike at the employment of children engaged in 
agriculture. I do not pretend that working children on the farm is bad 
for them.;,360 State child labor statutes passed during the Progressive 
Era routinely excluded farm work.361 Indeed, as the anti-child labor 
355. 83 Cong. Rec. 9257 ( 1938). 
356. Curtiss, supra n. 351, at 305; see Patrick M. Anderson, The Agricultural 
Employee Exemption from the Fair Labor Standard Act of 1938, 12 Hamline L. Rev 
649, 656 ( 1989). 
357. ,82 Cong. Rec. 1477 (1937). 
358-. The Keating-Owen Act did not cover farm labor and the National Labor 
Relations Act likewise excluded agricultural 1abor from its protection of union 
organization and collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C.S. 142(3) (2010). For a detailed 
description of the exclusion of agricultural laborers from the FLSA, reference 
Anderson, supra n. 356. 
359. Trattner, supra n. 84, at 149. In 1785, Thomas Jefferson declared that 
"[c]ultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens. They are the most vigorous, 
the most independent, the most virtuous, and they are tied to their country and wedded 
to its liberty and interests by the most lasting bonds." The Jefferson Monticello, 
Jefferson, Quotations on Agriculture, 
http://www. monticello.org/si te/jeffersonlquotations-agriculture (accessed Feb. 7, 
2011). 
360. Trattner,. supra n. 84, at 149. 
361. See e.g. N.Y. Labor L. § 130 (1923) ("no child under 14 years of age shall be 
employed in ... any factory, mercantile establishment, business office ... or in the 
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movement in the cities strengthened, more youths seem to have 
become employed in agriculture.362 
But more was at work than the importance of cheap labor and the 
Myth of the American Farmer. Race was, and continues to be, a 
decisive factor. In many areas of the country, particularly in the South, 
African-Americans were concentrated in agricultural labor and 
domestic work, sectors explicitly left out of New Deal legislation. 
Black share-croppers were an important source of southern farm 
production;363 providing minimum wage coverage to them and to black 
domestic workers would have upset the existing Jim Crow socio-
economic hierarchy in these states. "[T]he primary ... beneficiaries of 
the exclusion were the large agricultural employers of the South (and 
of California) who depended upon a cheap supply of minority labor, 
much as they had depended upon slave labor before 1865."364 Blacks 
worked in conditions of near peonage,365 reflecting the political and 
legal hierarchy. 
Bourbon aristocracy had resumed power in the southern states 
after their agreement to back Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican 
candidate in the disputed 1876 presidential race. They now ruled the 
political~economic-social life of the former Confederacy and had 
succeeded in almost completely disenfranchising and subordinating 
African-Americans, often the majority of the population in many 
political units. Southern states had rewritten their constitutions to deny 
blacks and often poor whites as well the right to vote.366 Post-Civil 
War Amendments and statutes notwithstanding, the High Court had 
distribution or transmission of merchandise, articles or messages, or in the sale of 
articles"); Trattner, supra n. 84, at 148-149. 
362. See Trattner, supra n. 84, at 153; DuPre Lumpkin & Wolff Douglas, supra n. 
334, at 61 (more than 500,000 youths were working in agriculture in 1930). 
363. White planters preferred black to white sharecroppers because they could get 
more work out of the blacks for less pay. Representatives in Congress blocked any 
effort to change the Jim Crow status quo. Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil 
Rights 7 (Harvard U. Press 2007). 
364. Linder, supra n. 354, at 1337-1338. 
365. Aside from the existing exploitative rural sharecropper system, African-
Americans from all over the country were enticed during the 1930's by the federal 
government's United States Employment Service to Southern farm jobs, such as those 
offered by the huge United States Sugar Company where they worked under conditions 
of virtual slavery. Goluboff, supra n. 363, at 7-8, 139-140. 
366. John Hope Franklin & Alfred A. Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom, A 
History of African Americans 286 ( 1 947). 
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placed its imprimatur on southern white supremacy in cases 
interpreting federal civil rights laws and state-sponsored 
segregation. 367 The disenfranchis_ement of blacks was legitimated in 
1903 by Giles v. Harris,368 when the Supreme Court dismissed a suit 
on behalf of 5,000 black citizens of Alabama purged from the voting 
rolls as a result of the imposition of the various clauses of the new 
Alabama Constitution.369 In a shocking abdication of judicial power, 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' majority opinion argued that federal 
equity had no power to require local officials to allow the black 
plaintiffs to register. 370 
As a result of Giles and s_ubsequent cases involving the same 
plaintiffs,371 literacy tests, property and poll tax requirements, 
"grandfather" clauses, and similar techniques were used for decades to 
disenfranchise African-Americans throughout the South.372 Indeed, it 
was not until Smith v. Allwright,313 more than forty years after Giles, 
that the Supreme Court got around to deciding that the rules of the 
Democratic Party of Texas excluding African-Americans from 
participating in the party primary, the only significant election in most 
southern states, was a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.374 
The disenfranchisement of southern blacks had a direct effect on 
the provisions of federal statutes such as the FLSA. As political 
science Professor V.O. Key, Jr. explained in his classic 1949 work, 
Southern Politics: 315 
367. See e.g. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-552 (1896) (upholding state 
and local white supremacist laws); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 61-62 (1883) 
(holding unconstitutional the 1 875 Civil Rights Act). 
368. See 189 U.S. 475, 486-493 (I 903). 
369. The Alabama constitutional provisions used to exclude black voters included 
the "good character and understand" clause. /d. at 483. 
370. Rather, legislative relief was necessary because simply registering blacks 
under a flawed system would not cure the a11eged fraud.- /d. at 487-488. 
371. See Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146, 162 ... 163 (1904) (suit seeking damages for 
refusal to register black voters dismissed). 
372. Franklin & Moss, supra n. 366, at 283. 
373. 321 u.s. 649 (1944). 
374. /d. at 663-664; see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 494 (1953) (holding that a 
private political organization called the Jaybird Democratic Party could not exc1ude 
blacks from its primaries on racial grounds). 
375. Robert K. Fleck, Democratic Opposition to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938, 62 J. of Ecort History 25, 27 (2002) (citing V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics 528 
(1949)). 
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[T]he stout defense by southern Congressman of child labor, 
in an earlier day, and, more recently, of regional wage 
differentials with southern workers on the short end, 
illustrates the indifference of southern politicians toward 
their non-voting laboring constituents.376 
153 
Southern congressmen from districts with high numbers of non-voting 
African-Americans opposed the FLSA, joining with conservative 
~epublicans to block passage for almost a year and then voting against 
tt.3"77 The battle over the FLSA marked the end of the New Deal and 
the beginning of a new Southern Dixiecrat-Republican coalition that 
would rule Congress for decades. 
Today, the correlation between race and farm work remains. 
Nationally, approximately 85% of current farm workers, including 
children, are members_ of racial minorities. Today these workers are 
Cahfornta, 99% of farm workers are Latino. 37 The qu1d pro quo patd 
for congressional passage of the FLSA was a heavy price indeed. The 
cost is felt to this day. 
V .CONCLUSION 
From the founding of the American colonies until the present day, 
child labor has remained a constant feature of our United States 
economy. This fact has been ratified by political/legal choices made 
for hundreds of years. The most visible decisions about child labor 
were made by conservative federal courts, particularly the Supreme 
Court Although there have long been legislative attempts to 
376. /d. at 27. 
377. Only 44% of Southern Democratic senators voted in favor of the FLSA, in 
contrast with overwhelming support among Democratic senators from the rest of the 
country. On the vote to pass the House version of the FLSA, a solid majority, forty-
nine to thirty-seven, of Southern Democratic Representatives, voted against the bill. 
Democratic congresspersons from other regions were almost unanimous in support, 
one hundred ninety-four to three. /d. at 32. Even the statutory exemption for 
agriculture was not enough to bring these southern congressmen to support the FLSA. 
378. Dept.. of Lab., A Demographic and Entployment Profile of U.S. Farm Workers 
48-49, http://www .doleta.gov/agworker/report9/naws_rpt9. pdf (Match 2005). 
379. See Child Lab. Coalition, Children in the Fields Campaign Fact Sheet, 
http://www.stopchildlabor.org/Consumercampaigns/fields.htm (accessed Feb. 7, 2011) 
(an increasing number of immigrant children traveling to the United States and finding 
many migrant farm communities to be almost 99% Latino). 
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ameliorate or end this employment, all have foundered in the face of 
fierce opposition by employers and others. The ineffectiveness of the 
FLSA of 1938, supposedly the death knell for child labor, is a result of 
cleverly drafted exemptions and long-term administrative non-
enforcement. The FLSA reflects the complicated and interwoven 
effect of ideology, economic and political power, and our own 
"American Dilemma" race. 
The types of jobs youth currently hold are different from those in 
previous generations. Most of our ~outh workforce is concentrated in 
entry-level, age-segregated jobs3 0 with few opportunities for 
meaningful interaction with adults, skill acquisition or long-term 
employment. These are simply not career opportunities.381 This type 
of work during adolescence provides few benefits and can jeopardize a 
successful transition to adulthood. 
The big winners from this state of affairs are employers able to 
hire cheap, unskilled workers, and the sellers of goods and services 
consumed by this large pool of adolescent buyers. The losers include 
working youth and society as a whole. While work presents potential 
benefits, it also poses substantial immediate and long-term risks-
academic, health and social for adolescents and their families. In 
essence, we are trading the future welfare of children and their families 
for immediate, short-term gratification. This is an extraordinarily poor 
trade-off. 
I do not believe that all youth must attend school until the age of 
eighteen. For many, true job training, vocational education and other 
paths are better suited to their short- and long-terrn needs. But current 
child labor reflects little advantage for them and should be radically 
restructured. Many Americans have enlisted in the worthy crusade to 
remedy the scandalous abuses of child labor in undeveloped Third 
World countries. This is praiseworthy, but we should pay equal 
attention to the problems of child labor here at home. 
380. See Greenberger & Steinberg, supra n. 12, at 51. 
381. See id. at 57. 
